







APPLICATION OF DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
TO PROBLEMS OF MILITARY CONFLICT:
TACTICAL ALLOCATION PROBLEMS - PART III
James G. Taylor
May 1974
Final Report for Period
September 1973 - May 1974
\pproved for public release; distribution unlimited
FEDDOCS repared for:
D208.14/2:NPS-55TW74051 ffice of Nayal Research> Arlington, Virginia 22217
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California




This research was supported by Naval Analysis Programs, Office of
Naval Research under ONR Project Order PO-4-0174 and Task Number NR
276-039.
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.
This report was prepared by:
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER
NPS-55Tw74051
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
APPLICATION OF DIFFERENTIAL
GAMES TO PROBLEMS OF MILITARY CONFLICT:
TACTICAL ALLOCATION PROBLEMS - PART III
5. TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOD COVERED
Final Report for
September 1973 - May 1974
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfa.) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*;
James G. Taylor
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940 Code 55Tw
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS
61153 N; RR614-11-05;
NR 276-039; PO-4-0174
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
kME14. MONITORING AGENCY NAM ft ADDRESSf// dlllerent from Controlling Oltice) 15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thla report)
UNCLASSIFIED
15a. DECLASSI Ft CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abatract entered In Block 20, It dlllerent from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide II necaaaary and Identity by block number)
Military Tactics Time-Sequential Combat Games
Campaign Strategies Optimal Distribution of Fire
Lanchester Theory of Combat Combat Dynamics
Tactical Allocation Differential Games
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae aide II necaaaary and Identity by block number)
The mathematical theory of differential games is used to study the
structure of optimal allocation strategies for some time-sequential combat
games with combat described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. As
required by such applications, some new theoretical results are given: first
order necessary conditions of optimality are developed for differential games
with state variable inequality constraints. These results are used to study






73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 |
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Entered)
UNCLASSIFIED
,LLUWITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWien Data Entered)
model, optimal air-war strategies are further studied within the context of
land-war objectives. Optimal fire-support strategies are studied in an
attack scenario with a differential game model. A comprehensive survey of
previous literature on each of the above topics is given. Finally, some
problems for possible future study are discussed.
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(TWi»n Data Entered)
SUMMARY
The mathematical theory of differential games is used to study the
structure of optimal allocation strategies for some time-sequential
combat games with combat described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare.
Although most of this work concerns the application of existing theory for
the determination of optimal campaign strategies in various Lanchester-
type differential games of tactical interest, theoretical developments are
also given consideration.
Previous research by the author had uncovered an important gap in the
existing theory of differential games: no adequate theory of state variable
inequality constraints existed for differential games. Such a theory is
essential for Lanchester-type differential games because, for example, of
the requirement that force levels be non-negative. Consequently, in this
report first-order necessary conditions of optimality are developed for
differential games with state variable inequality constraints. These results
are then applied to the study of optimal compaign strategies in several
differential games of tactical interest.
Optimal air-war campaign strategies are studied in a generalization
of a well-known tactical air-war model. Previous work had never given
adequate consideration to necessary conditions of optimality with respect
to the non-negativity of aircraft force levels. The work at hand extends
previous work by considering a value for survivors at the end of the air
war and variable (effectiveness) coefficients. Several specific problems
are solved. The effects of temporal variations in the return from ground
support on optimal campaign strategies are studied.
The differential game model discussed above has been criticized
because it does not evaluate air-war tactics within the context of ground-
war objectives. Consequently, this model produces suboptimization. Hence,
a model is considered which is considerably broader in scope, does consider
land-war objectives, but (unfortunately) is considerably less susceptible
to closed-form analytic solution. For this new model partial results
concerning the determination of optimal campaign strategies are obtained
and contrasted with those for the model previously discussed above.
The determination of optimal fire distribution strategies for
supporting weapon systems is a major problem of military operations
research. The author has studied some aspects of this problem in previous
research. Motivated by a paper which recently appeared in the open liter-
ature, optimal fire-support strategies are studied in an attack scenario.
The dependence of optimal fire-support strategies on combatant objectives
is examined for a problem previously considered in the open literature:
necessary and sufficient conditions on the functional form of the criterion
functional (terminal payoff only) for the optimal fire-support strategies
to be independent of force levels (at least for a certain range of values)
are developed. This shows that certain results previously reported in the
literature are, in general, not true. A variation of this problem is
then considered. In contrast to the previous work reported in the litera-
ture, the attrition structure of the problem at hand leads to the optimal
fire-support strategy of the attacker requiring him to sometimes split his
artillery fire between enemy infantry and artillery (counterbattery fire)
.
Numerical examples are given.
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Finally, some problems for possible future study are discussed.
The formulation of these problems is based on the author's past research
experiences. As is usually the case, work on the problems considered
here and elsewhere has uncovered other aspects of interest that appear
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1 • Introduction .
This report is the third in a series of reports which document
the author's research on the structure of optimal (time-sequential)
allocation policies for tactical situations described by Lanchester-
type equations of warfare. By considering several combat scenarios,
further insights have been gained into such important questions as:
(1) How should fire be distributed over targets?
(2) How should targets be selected?
(3) Do target priorities change over time?
(4) Do force levels affect the optimal allocation strategies?
(5) How does the number of target types affect the optimal
allocation strategies?
(6) Do conflict termination circumstances affect the optimal
allocation strategies?
(7) How are the optimal fire distribution/target selection
strategies affected by the nature of the attrition processes?
(8) What is the effect of logistics constraints on such policies?
(9) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat affect
optimal allocation strategies?
Specific objectives of this research have been the identification
of decision parameters and the further development of general principles
for target selection, regulation of firing rate, and allocation of
military resources in dynamic combat situations. A further discussion
of research objectives and their relationship to defense planning
problems can be found in the author's past reports* [11], [12],
*
A comprehensive review of pertinent literature prior to 1973 in the
fields of (a) Lanchester-type models of warfare, (b) differential games,
and (c) optimal control of Lanchester-type attrition processes is also
to be found in [12]
.
It should be pointed out that although the quantitative analysis of tactics
may be considered to be a relatively new field of military operations
research, there is wide-spread interest in such work (see [6], [8], [9],
[10], [19]).
Our approach has been to combine Lanchester-type models of warfare
with generalized control theory (both deterministic and stochastic optimal
control, dynamic programming, and differential games) [12], [15] (see also
[16]). This has been done by considering a sequence of concrete problems.
Additionally, the report at hand contains some basic research on the
theory of differential games. Past research [12], [15] had identified as
an important gap in the existing theory of differential games the lack
of adequate theory (i.e. necessary conditions of optimality) for problems
with state variable inequality constraints (SVIC's).
The organization of this report is to discuss results in general
terms in the main body and to leave details for the appendices. This
has been partially necessitated by the wide scope of problems examined
(from theoretical to applied)
.
2 . Guided Tour of t he J\pp end ices .
In this section we summarize the work which is contained in the
appendices and explain why this work was done. The results reported
here may be considered to be extensions of our earlier work [11], [12],
[15]. Moreover, the work at hand lays the foundations for more extensive
work on the quantitative analysis of tactics and applications of generalized
control theory to problems of military operations research.
In Appendix A we develop a theory of state variable inequality
constraints for Lanchester-type differential games. First order
necessary conditions of optimality are developed for the class of problems
in which individual state variables are bounded by functions of time.
Although this certainly is not the most general type of state variable
Inequality constraint (SVIC) , it does include all Lanchester-type
differential games that occur in military operations research. First
order necessary conditions of optimality are also stated (but not proved)
for more general problems. In particular, results are given without proof
for problems with a fairly general type of SVIC. The proofs of these
results will be given in the future.
Recently, we pointed out [12], [15] that no adequate multiplier
conditions existed for (Lanchester-type) differential games with state
variable inequality constraints and gave this top research priority.
It is indeed remarkable that essentially all previous applications of
the theory of differential games to Lanchester-type problems (see, for
example, [1] , [ 2] , [ A] , [5 ] , [ 7] ) are inadequate in one respect or another
with respect to SVIC's. A further discussion and substantiation of
this claim is to be found in Appendix A. This work establishes the
mathematical foundations for future applications of the theory of dif-
ferential games because force levels must be, for example, non-negative
(see [17] for a discussion within the context of Lanchester-type optimal
control problems).
In Appendices B and C we apply the theoretical results of Appendix
A to the study of optimal air-war strategies. This has been over the
years a problem of lasting interest for defense planners. In Appendix B
we consider a generalization of the tactical air-war game of A. Mengel
[41 (see also [3]) in which aircraft effectiveness may vary over time and
a residual value for aircraft at the end of the campaign is considered.
Optimal strategies are characterized for this general problem. A
complete solution (i.e. explicit determination of optimal closed-loop
strategies) is given for cases of constant coefficients. These results
are much more general than previous ones and provide much insight into
tradeoffs between various planning parameters. Preliminary results are
also obtained for problems in which aircraft effectiveness in the air
war is constant but the value of ground support changes over time. The
latter is an attempt to reflect the influence of combat air support on
the ground war and hence avoid suboptimization. Two cases of time-
dependent "returns" from ground support are considered:
(a) linearly-decreasing-with-time returns from ground support,
(b) exponentially-decreasing-with-time returns from ground support.
One criticism that has been made of the model considered in
Appendix B is that it does not evaluate air-war strategies within the
context of ground-war objectives. In other words, this model (unfor-
tunately) produces suboptimization. Thus, in Appendix C we present
preliminary results for a model which considers the development of
optimal air-war strategies within the context of land-war objectives.
These preliminary results show that the outcome of the ground war may
be a significant factor in the determination of optimal air-war strategies,
The research reported in Appendices B and C was undertaken because
an important question for defense planners is what are appropriate
missions over the course of a campaign for tactical air power. The
answer to this question has far-reaching implications for Navy air forces
(both carrier-based and land-based) and, of course, the Air Force.
Recently, the USAF Studies and Analysis Group has been using quantitative
methodology [19] in trying to answer such questions. By considering the
results given in Appendices B and C one can begin to see the effects of
the nature of the combat optimization problem on the structure of optimal
air-war strategies.
The determination of optimal fire distribution strategies for
supporting weapon systems is a major problem of military operations
research. This problem is particularly of interest to the military
tactician so that he may have a clearer understanding of the circum-
stances, for example, under which enemy infantry should be engaged by a
supporting weapon system (such as artillery) and those under which "counter-
battery" fire is to be preferred. Furthermore, the study of such tactical
time-sequential allocation problems is relevant to the Navy mission of
fire support (both by ship gunfire and by carrier-based air).
In Appendix D we further consider the determination of optimal fire
distribution strategies for supporting weapon systems. In this case it
is appropriate to call the supporting weapon system artillery. We consider
extensions of some recent work by Kawara [5] concerning optimal strategies
for supporting weapon systems in an attack scenario which is a variation
of a model considered by Weiss [20]. We first examine for what class of
criterion functionals (terminal payoff only) the optimal fire-support
strategies are independent of the force levels and then examine the depen-
dence of the optimal fire-support strategies upon the form of the combat
attrition model by considering slightly different combat dynamics than
those considered by Kawara [5]: we assume that the attacker's artillery
produces "linear-law" attrition (see [13], [16]) against both the defender's
artillery as well as infantry. The development of a complete solution
to the latter problem has involved solution phenomena not previously
encountered in a Lanchester-type differential game: the dual variables
are discontinuous across a manifold of discontinuity of both players'
strategies
.
The research reported in Appendix D was undertaken to obtain a
better understanding of the dependence of the structure of optimal
fire-support strategies upon model form. Previous work by Weiss [20]
(see also [4]) and Kawara [5] had given the impression that an optimal
fire-support strategy consists in always concentrating all fire on one
enemy target type. From our previous work [13] on a one-sided
Lanchester-type, time-sequential fire distribution problem in which each
of two enemy target types undergoes a "linear-law" attrition process, we
knew that an optimal fire distribution policy could consist in splitting
one's fire between available target types. This was our motivation for
the examination of other attrition structures in Kawara 's problem.
Additionally, Kawara's recent work [5] stimulated our research on the
influence of combatant objectives on optimal fire-support strategies
because of Kawara's remarkable result that (at least within a certain
range of force levels) optimal fire-support strategies do not depend on
force levels. We were able to show that Kawara had used the only type of
objective function that yeilds this result. Thus, in general, the result
is not true.
In Appendix E we briefly describe several important problems for
possible future research. These problems were formulated giving
consideration to our past research experiences (both that reported here
and also elsewhere). These problems may be referred to as
(a) optimal fire support for several ground units,
(b) a Lanchester-type optimal control problem with logistics
considerations
,
(c) an examination of the influence of the form of the criterion
functional on optimal strategies in time-sequential combat
optimization problems.
As explained in Appendix E, work on these campaign analysis problems
would appreciably enhance our understanding of methodology for the
optimization of combat dynamics.
3 . Summary of Research Findings.
Here we summarize our research results. We have (at least partially)
accomplished the following tasks which were suggested for future research
in our previous report [12]: (a), (b2), (e)
, (g)*, (il), (j2), and (k)
.
Results are organized under the following headings:
(1) solution methodology for time-sequential combat games,
(2) insights gained into the optimization of combat dynamics,
(3) implications for defense planning.
Items (2) and (3) differ in that the latter is a management-oriented
digest of the practical implications of our research, whereas the former
is oriented towards a technical audience. Further amplification of
results and conclusions is to be found in the appendices.
a. Solution Methodology for Time-Sequential Combat Games .
Our research has produced the following results on solution
methodology for time-sequential combat games. Specifically, we have
accomplished the following:
*See [18]. 7
(1) developed theory of state variable inequality constraints
for Lanchester-type differential games (This theory is
essential for all problems with, for example, negativity
restrictions on force levels
. )
,
(2) demonstrated use of theory of state variable inequality
constraints for solving time-sequential combat games by
developing solutions to several specific combat optimiza-
tion problems,
(3) developed complete solution to a fire support differential
game. This involved the following technical difficulties:
(a) singular surfaces,
(b) discontinuity in the dual variables,
(4) developed methodology for determining the functional form
of the criterion functional (terminal payoff here) which
yields optimal strategies that do not depend on force
levels (at least for a certain range of force levels),
(5) concluded that computational methods must give consideration
to structural properties of optimal strategies in idealized
versions like those considered in this report.
b . Insights Gained into the Optimization of Combat Dynamics .
Based on our study of the optimization of combat dynamics using
the mathematical theory of differential games, we have reached the following
conclusions
:




(b) combat attrition model,
(c) battle termination model;
the dependence is complex, and future research should concen-
trate upon the examination of numerous structures of
tactical interest,
(2) optimal fire-support strategies depend on the nature of the
attrition process produced by the supporting weapon system;
when the supporting weapon system produces casualties at a
rate proportional to the product of the numbers of firers
and targets of a particular type (see Appendix D for
mathematical formulation), the optimal fire-support strategy
of the supporting weapon system has the following character-
istics:
(a) it depends on the optimal strategy for the enemy's
supporting weapon system,
(b) the optimal distribution of supporting fires may be
(i) to concentrate on enemy infantry,
(ii) to split fire to avoid overkilling,
(iii) to concentrate on enemy artillery,
(c) counterbattery fire is the optimal strategy during
the early stages of an attack and destruction of
enemy infantry is the optimal strategy during the
final moments (unless the ratio of defender infantry
to defender artillery is "extremely" large, in which
case the infantry is always engaged)
,
(d) a split of supporting fires between enemy infantry
and artillery as an optimal strategy can only occur
when enemy infantry have some effectiveness against
friendly infantry,
(3) optimal air-war strategies are different for the case
in which ground war objectives are considered than for
that in which they are not,
(4) optimal air-war strategies (see Appendix B for scenario)
depend on the following factors:
(a) residual value of surviving aircraft,
(b) force levels (especially when a side is going to
lose the fight for air supremacy: faced with a
future loss of airpower, one may abandon the fight
for air supremacy and get what ground support one
can from his planes before he loses them all),
(5) cases with variations over time in weapon system
effectiveness are best studied as extensions of constant
coefficient cases.
c. Implications for Defense Planning
.
In our research reported here we have studied idealizations
of allocation structures that commonly occur in defense planning studies.
After studying these idealizations in order to gain insight into the
structure of optimal strategies in the complex real-world problem, we
have reached the following conclusions as to considerations that should
be brought to the attention of defense planners. These results should
be kept in mind by practitioners who perform more detailed computer
simulation studies.
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(1) The combat optimization problem should be thought of as
consisting of three parts:
(i) combatant objectives,
(ii) conflict termination conditions,
(iii) combat dynamics.
Optimal combat strategies depend on all three of the
above. More basic scientific research should be done on
all three, especially the first two.
(2) Force levels do affect (either directly or indirectly)
optimal combat strategies.
(3) It may be quite dangerous to generalize optimal combat
strategies developed for specific problems. At present,
more research is needed on specific problems in order to
develop an understanding of the qualifications that may
be necessary to make about specific study results.
(4) Optimal air-war strategies must be based on ground-war
objectives. Suboptimization results when this is not
done. This suboptimization is a serious problem, since
it may lead to winning the air campaign but losing the war,
4 . Suggested Future Research Tasks.
After performing the research documented in this report, we feel that
the current state-of-the-art for applying the theory of differential games
to time-sequential combat games is such that more significant results
may be readily obtained in the future. Moreover, this previous research
provides valuable perspective for identifying what appear to be the most
important research tasks to be considered next. In our opinion the most
important task is to examine (and then understand) the influence of objec-
tives on optimal strategies. Another important task is to study the
structure of optimal fire-support strategies.
Based on our past research experience we feel that there is much to be
accomplished in the future. Specifically, we suggest the following as
future research tasks:
(a) Examination of the effects of campaign objectives (as reflected
by the criterion functional) on the structure of optimal campaign
strategies. In all our past research we have with one exception
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always considered a linear utility for survivors in the criterion
functional. It is of interest to examine how the valuation of
survivors affects the structure of optimal strategies. Other
criterion functionals that might be considered are
(1) nonlinear valuation of survivors (either the difference
or ratio of functions which are, for example, concave,
quasi-concave, etc.),
(2) the value of losses rather than survivors.
It would seem appropriate to begin such an investigation by con-
sidering the simplest problem possible.
(b) Further study of optimal fire-support strategies. The actual
military operations must be analyzed and decisions identified.
For various cases, the appropriate scenario and, consequently,
Lanchester-type model would be developed (see Appendix E) , and
the optimization problem studied. It is felt that at this time
it is most important to study various specific problems in order
to gain insight into the structure of optimal fire-support strategies.
(c) Examination of the effects of logistics constraints on optimal
campaign strategies. Models would be developed to relate logistics
capability to combat effectiveness and then appropriate combat
optimization problems formulated. Such research would provide
insight into the worth of the Navy logistics (pipeline) role in
combat service support missions (see Appendix E)
.
(d) Further study the determination of optimal air-war strategies
within the context of land-war objectives. Based on preliminary
results given in this report, it appears as though the outcome of
the ground war is a significant factor* in the determination of
optimal air-war strategies and that optimal strategies developed
for a model not considering land-war objectives need not be optimal
for a model which does consider them. This proposed research
would extend the results given in Appendix C of the report at hand.
A more comprehensive (although somewhat dated now) discussion of
suggested future research tasks can also be found on pages 65-67 of our
previous report [12]. Work still remains to be done on the following
tasks suggested there: (b), (c), (d)
,
(f), (h), and (j).
*This is not considered, for example, in TAC CONTENDER [19]
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APPENDIX A: Necessary Conditions of Optimality for Differential Games
with State Variable Inequality Constraints.
1. Introduction .
In our most recent report on applications of differential games to
problems of military conflict [22] we suggested as a future research task
that a theory of state variable inequality constraints (SVIC's) be developed
for Lanchester-type differential games (see [23]). This suggestion was
based on our discovery of an important gap in the existing theory of
differential games: no adequate treatment of multiplier conditions for
differential games with SVIC's then existed in the literature. As we have
pointed out previously [23], [25], state variable inequality constraints
are present in all Lanchester-type dynamic tactical allocation problems
because force levels (which are represented by state variables ) are required
to be non-negative (or some equivalent condition). Thus, the development
of a theory of SVIC's is essential for an adequate characterization of an
optimal strategy in such a problem (see examples given in Appendix B) . It
is indeed remarkable that this important gap in theoretical results has
not even been noted by other workers in operations research.
The origins of the theory of differential games are given in [10].
Since the publication of this paper in 1965 and that of the highly signifi-
cant book by Isaacs [11] , numerous papers have been published on the subject
of differential games. Further references can be found in [22]. Necessary
conditions of optimality have been developed for differential games by
Isaacs [11] and Berkovitz [3], [4]. In two highly technical and significant
papers [3], [4], Berkovitz developed necessary conditions for problems
A-2
subject to various types of inequality constraints except those only
involving functions of the state variables (i.e. except SVIC's). Varia-
tional methods were used in [3] by reducing the problem to two associated
variational problems. In [4] the properties of the value function were
utilized to develop these conditions by use of Isaacs' "tenet of transi-
tion." Schmitendorf and Citron [16] extended Berkovitz's variational
approach to second order conditions and developed a conjugate point condi-
tion for a class of differential games. Later, Schmitendorf [15] used the
same approach to develop (both first and also second order) necessary
conditions of optimality for (zero-sum deterministic) differential games
in which one or both players are restricted to use open-loop control. The
development of necessary conditions has also been disucssed by Chattopadhyay
[7].
In this appendix we will develop necessary conditions of optimality
for differential games with SVIC's by an extension of the approach of
Berkovitz [3]. The development of necessary conditions for such problems
has apparently not been accomplished before although sufficient conditions
for optimality have been derived by a number of workers [13], [18].
Quite independently of the above developments A. Friedman began a
careful study of the existence of value for a differential game and existence
of a saddle point in pure strategies. This work led to the book [9] and
has continued. Differential games with SVIC's have been considered by
Friedman, but he has focused primarily on the question of existence of
value for them (see Chapter 6 of [9]). We have used Friedman's results
in our past work [19], [20], [21]. However, Friedman [9] does not develop
the two-sided analogues of well-known control theory multiplier conditions




In fact, the treatment of the example on pp. 239-240 of [9] is inadequate,
since the approach fails to yield optimal strategies for minor modifications
in the problem's formulation (see Appendix B) . Moreover, this problem is
very important for military operations research (see Appendix B)
.
The research reported in this appendix is of a more basic nature
than that reported elsewhere in this report. These results are also of
much wider application than to the problems of defense planning upon which
the author has concentrated. Moreover, the derivation of these results
allows one to identify the class of problems to which such multiplier
conditions apply. It should be noted that not all system dynamics give
rise to such conditions.
2 . A Lanchester-Type Differential Game .
In [23] we coined the term Lanchester-type differential game as
referring to a differential game in which the system dynamics are described
by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. To be precise, we are considering
two-person zero-sum deterministic differential games in which each player
uses a closed-loop (or feedback) strategy. A formulation which is rele-
vant to our research on tactical allocation problems is as follows:
n m
maximize minimize { £ w.y.(t f ) - £ v.x.(t f )},




- T = 0,
dx. n
subject to: -— = r. - ) i|>..a..y. for i = 1,
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x.(t), y.(t) are force levels,
r., s. are replacement rates,11
v., w. are the utilities assigned survivors,11
a.. is the rate at which one Y. unit can destroy X.,
ij J i




is the fraction of X. who fire at Y.,
and il>
. .
is the fraction of Y. who fire at X..
ij J i
The above problem (1) contains all the essential features (and can be
made identical to by minor changes in formulation) of all the Lanchester-
type differential games studied previously in the operations research
literature (see [23]).
It should be noted that we use capital letters to denote a strategy
(see [3] or [9] for precise definitions), whereas the corresponding lower
case letter is used to denote the realization of the strategy (Friedman
uses the term outcome (see pp. 22-23 of [9]). A strategy is a mapping




it is a contingincy plan that tells us what to do depending upon where we
find ourselves in the state space (time may sometimes be an additional
state variable). In other words, we have f = ¥(t,x,y) where ¥ denotes
r*~> ***> SSS r^
a q vector, x denotes an m vector, and y denotes an n vector.
Then strategic variable is the realization (or outcome) of a strategy as
follows
:
ijCt) = ^.(t.x.y). (2)
As mentioned above, we will refer to (1) as a Lanchester-type
differential game. This suggests that we consider the following problem
(denoted as "Problem I") for the development of necessary conditions of
optimality for a class of differential games with SVIC's.
Problem I. „
T




subject to: x = f(t,x,y,v),
/^ r*s ^w <v
u(t) , v(t) are unrestricted (scalar) strategic variables,





y (t) <: 3(t) for all t € [0,T] constraints),
with scalar terminal condition F(T,x(T) ,y(T) ) = 0,
*
We use standard notation for vectors, etc. as defined, for example, on
pp. 4-6 of [8] .
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where we assume that all functions are smooth enough to insure the
existence of all partial derivatives required in the following analysis.
In Problem I above, x is an m-vector of state variables, and y is an
n-vector of state variables.
3. Mathematical Preliminaries .
In this section we further establish our notation and state our
assumptions. We consider closed-loop (or feedback) s trategies
,
denoted
as U(t,x,y) and V(t,x,y), for the players. A strategy then is the
specification of what value should be given to a player's strategic variable
at each point in time depending upon the time and current values of the
state variables. The realization (or outcome) of a strategy will be
denoted by the corresponding lower case letter. Thus
u(t) = U(t,x,y) and v(t) = V(t ,x,y)
.
(3)
We call u(t) and v(t) strategic variables .




J = G(T,x(T),y(T)) + L(t ,x(t) ,y (t) ,u(t) ,v(t) )dt . (4)
r**s **** r** ***
Player I chooses U(t,x,y) and tries to maximize J, while Player II
chooses V(t,x,y) and tries to minimize J. We say that (U*,V*) is a
saddle point of J if
J(u,V*(t,x,y)) <; J(U*(t,x,y),V*(t,x,y)) <; J (U*(t ,x,y) ,v) . (SPC)
A-
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Then (U*,V*) is the solution to Problem I. We denote the value of the
differential game as W. Then
W = J(U*,V*). (5)
We assume that Problem I has value and a saddle point in pure strategies.
It will be convenient to denote the vector of state variables as
T T T
*"W *"W




Although not essential for the development of necessary conditions of
optimality, to insure the existence of value for the differential game we
assume
L(t,z,u,v) = L (t,x,y,u) + L (t,x,y,v). (8)
It is assumed that both players have perfect information as to the
state variables. In other words, both players know precisely the current
state of the system.
We assume that the first time derivative of y (t) explicitly
n
•
contains the strategic variable u and that (y ) = g (t,x,y,u) ^
n n ~ ~
u u
along an optimal trajectory. We further assume that the first time
derivative of x (t) explicitly contains the strategic variable v and
that (x ) = f (t,x,y,v) ^ along an optimal trajectory. In other
m m #w A/
v v
*
Several other technical conditions must be satisfied to guarantee the
existence of value and of a saddle point in pure strategies to Problem I
(see Chapter 6 of [9]).
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words, we assume that x (t) ^ a(t) and y (t) £ B(t) are the appropriate
types of first order SVIC's (see [12]).
4 . Statement of Necessary Conditions of Optimality for Problem I .
First we define
T
H(t,z,p,q,n,u,v) = L(t,z,u,v) + p f(t,x,y,v)
+ q
T
g(t,x,y,u) - n-.(t){x -a(t)} - n„(t){y -(B(t)}, (9)
*<r l m z nis* is*
where











for y < 3(t),
n
;> for y = (3(t) ,
n
and
<D(T,z(T),a) = G(T,x(T),y(T)) + cF(T,x(T) ,y(T) ) . (10)
*s* is* is* rs^ is*
Let x*(t) for £ y £ T denote the optimal path which results from
(U*(t,x,y), V*(t,x,y)). We assume that the solution to Problem I is normal
(see [1]) and that the optimal path is not tangent to the terminal manifold
or to any manifold of discontinuity of U* or V* or to the boundary of
the state space at entry to a constrained subarc which lies on the boundary,
Then, in order that the strategy pair (U*,V*) be a saddle point of the
criterion functional it is necessary that there exist unique functions
* thIn optimal control theory one says [6] that a problem has a p— order
SVIC when the pHL time derivative of the state-variable constraint is
the first to explicitly contain the control variable.
A-
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p(t), q(t) , n, (t) , and n~(t) and constants a, v , and v such
r+* rs*
that the following conditions hold
3H . 3L T
3&
_
-r— =0 or -^~ + q t— = t3u du ~ du
9H n 9L T
9
~ n
— = or — + p t— = 0,3v dv ^ dV
(11)
(12)
•T _ 3L T
31 T 3^ ,.m.Tp =H = — + p -r— + q H, (A ) ,

















- v (A ) where v
1
<
^ (15)1 ~ X [
:> for x (T) = ct(T),
3.
(T) = 3^TT " V 2 (i } Where V 2 1
















1 for i = j,
otherwise.
These results hold only when the boundary of the state space (at least the
part for which x = a(t)) is non-absorbing (see [24]). For an absorbing
state boundary we nave




y unrestricted for x
^ for x (T) = o(T) but x (t) > a(t) for t < T,
m
(T) = o(T) and x (t) = a(t) for
m
t <; t <: T with t < T.
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Analogous to the Weierstrass condition, we also have the max-min principle
H(u,v*) <: H(u*,v*) <:H(u*,v), (18)
which holds for all admissible u and v. H, P^(t),
and q(t) are continuous (vector-valued) functions except at manifolds
of discontinuity of both U* and V*, where for all differentials dt,





-p") Tdx - (q
+
-q~) Tdy = 0. (19)
In other words, at both entrances to and exits from constrained
subarcs on the boundary of the state space , we have
£(t") = £(t+), (20)
and
a(t-) = £(tt } ' (21)
H(t.) = H(t*), (22)
except possibly at manifolds of discontinuity of both U* and V*, where
all the dual variables are continuous except those corresponding to x
m
or y which describes the boundary,
n
The above first order necessary conditions of optimality for Problem
I_ are analogous to the optimal control theory results of Jacobson, Lele,
and Speyer [12]. The above results may also be written in a form analogous
to that of optimal control theory results of Berkovitz [2] and Gamkrelidze
(see Chapter VI in [14]). This is done by introducing new multipliers
X(t) such that
p(t) = \At) - u,(t)Am
,
(23)
~ *vL 1 ~




It is well known (see [24]) that we may then make the following identifications
n.(t) = -y.(t) for i = 1,2. (25)
5
.
Development of Necessary Conditions of Optimality .
It is convenient to re-write Problem I as (DG)
.
T
maximize minimize {G(T ,x(T) ,y (T) ) + L(t ,x,y ,u,v)dt}
,
U V ~ ~ J
subject to: x = f(t,x,y,v), (DG)
^W *N* <»»* rs*
y g(t,x,y,u)
,
SW /K* *S* ^^/
u(t) , v(t) are unrestricted (scalar) strategic variables,
x (t) ^ a(t) for all t
€
[0,T] (scalar state variable
m
y (t) <: g(t) for all t € [0,T]
inequality constraints)
,
with scalar terminal condition F(T ,x(T) ,y (T) ) = 0.
Considering the saddle point condition (SPC) for the criterion functional,
necessary conditions of optimality for (DG) will be developed according
to the approach of Berkovitz [3] in which maximum and minimum problems
associated with the game are considered. Necessary conditions of optimality
are developed for each of these two problems. It is then shown that these
two sets of conditions may be written as a single set of necessary condi-
tions for (DG) .
We extend Berkovitz 's variational approach to differential games
with SVIC's by treating boundary segments by two different methods in the
associated optimal control problems. For the simple case of bounded state
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variables at hand, we may think of both methods of treating an SVIC as
techniques in which the dimensionality of the state space is reduced for
a constrained subarc which lies on the boundary for a finite interval of
time.
5.1. Necessary Conditions for Control Problem A .
Thus, we are led to maximum and minimum problems associated with
(SPC) . The associated maximum problem we denote as Control Problem A
,
(CPA) . We are to determine u*(t) = U*(t,x,y) such that the following
holds :
maximize {G (T,x(T) ,y (T) ) + L(t ,z ,u,V* (t ,x,y) )dt} ,
U(t) i
Q
subject to: x = f (t,x,y,V*(t ,x,y) )
,
(CPA)
rs* f*** *n* f*j rs* rsmf
u(t) is unrestricted scalar control variable,
x (t) ^ a(t) and y (t) £ 3(t) for all t € [0,T],
m n
with scalar terminal condition F(T,x(T) ,y (T) ) = 0.
For (CPA) we assume that the first time derivative of y (t)
n
•
explicitly contains the control variable u and that (y ) = g (t,x,y,u)
n n ~ ~
u u
4- along an optimal trajectory. Let us note that in (CPA) we have
(x ) =0. Thus, variations in the control u have no direct influence
m
u
on a trajectory for which x (t) = a(t). Let us recall that we have
m
assumed that in (DG) the first time derivative of x (t) explicitly con-
m




optimal trajectory. Thus, in (CPA) we will have (since in (CPA) x (t) ^
m
+
ct(t) is a "rule of the game") x = f (t,x,y,V*(t ,x,y)) ^ a(t) when
m m **< ^* »v *w
x (t) = a(t) where f (t ) denotes a right hand limit.
m m
There are two cases to be considered in developing necessary condi-
tions of optimality for (CPA)
:
(1) x (t) > a(t) almost everywhere in time,
m
X X XX
(2) x (t) = a(t) for t m <: t <: t m . with t m < t m . .
m entry exit entry exit
CASE (1): x (t) > a(t) almost everywhere in time.
m
We will apply the results of Speyer [12] (see also [17] and [24])





,u) = L(t,z,u,V*(t,z)) + (pVf (t ,z ,V* (t , z) )
+ (qVg(t,z,u) - n,(t){y -3(t)}, (26)











$A (T,z(T),oA ) = G(T,x(T),y(T)) + A (T,x(T) ,y (T) ) . (27)
According to the results of Speyer [12], first order necessary conditions







= or ^ + (q ) — = 0, (28)3u 3u ~ 3u
<pV . . |L . ( A T n. _ AT jfc _ {|L + AT
"
~ 3x ~ 3x ~ 3x l 3v ** 3v J x
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/•AvT 9L , A.T
91
. A.T
3& ;3L , A.T 31« nN T ,„ rt .(q ) - - 9 (P ) (q ) T {— + (p ) — } V* + n (A ) , (30)A dy ~ dy A dy dv *- dv J y 2 ~
a*A a t . , = for x (T) > a(T),
(p (T)) = - v (A ) where v < (31)
3£(T) X ~ 1 W for x (T) = a(T),
m
^ (T)) = z„fr\ ~ V ? (A > where v < (32)





(T) + |i--+ v
^
a(T) + vA 6(T) = 0, (33)
where H (T) is an abbreviation for H(t=T,z(T)
,p (T) ,q (T),u*(T)). We
r** *+m0 e+s
will make copious use of such notational conveniences. We also have the
maximum principle
H
A (u,V*(t,z)) * HA (u*,V*(t,z)). (34)
A A A
H
,p (t) , and q (t) are continuous except at manifolds of discontinuity













") Tdy = 0. (35)
When y (t) < 3(t) almost everywhere in time, the above becomes
(except at manifolds of discontinuity)
£ + <sV2=0, (36)
As noted for equation (15) , these results hold only when the boundary of
the state space (at least the part on which yn = 3(t)) is non-absorbing
(see [24]). The reader is referred to the previous footnote for the state-
ment of terminal multiplier properties for an absorbing state boundary.
Henceforth, in order to contain the length of this appendix we will leave
it to the reader to supply such necessary qualifications for conditions
on terminal multipliers.
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,-A.T 3L , A.T
31 , A.T 3& r 3L , A.T 31» ....





~ 3x ~ 3x ~ 3x l 3v *- 3v J x
«w <s» **< «~
•A.T 3L , A.T
31 , A.T 3& r3L , A.T 3!i„. ,,_,.
(q ) - ~ T (p ) a (^ ) a IT
- + (P ) T~J V * < 38 )
~ 3y *~ 3y «* 3y l 3v ** 3v V
Using (36) , we may write the adjoint equations as
/'AvT 3L , A.T
3£ , A N T





ai - <£ ) t; - (q ) t; - (t: + (q ) tj! u*
^w
.•A.T 3L , A.T





" t; - (p ) t; - (q ) tt - It: + (q ) t^u*
3f
-e+CEV^V*. (40)3v ~ 3v J L
Y Y Y Y
When y (t) = B(t) for t
n £ t ^ t n . with t n < t n .
,
'n entry exit entry exit
we may reduce the dimension of the state space and also the adjoint variable





. . . ,P ) , Q
T
= (Q ,Q Q ) ,
~ 1 Z m ~ 1 Z n-l
£
T




z = (x ,y ) = (x , . . . ,x ,y , . . . ,y ),
~ *~ 1 ml n-l^w
V = V(t,z) = V(t,x,y,y = B(t)).
In other words, in the reduced state space the state variables are
x. , . . . ,x ,y. , . .
.
,y . , and the corresponding adjoint variables are denoted
1 ml n-l
A A
as P and Q . When V* is continuous at entry to the boundary of the
state space with y = 3(t), the corner conditions at such junctures to
Y
n
this reduced state space are (for example, at entry with t = t ) asr J
e entry





^ t P )
= £
A(t













Assuming that the optimal path is not tangent to the boundary of the state
_ •
space at entry to the constrained subarc (i.e. g (t ) - (3(t ) ^ 0) , itnee
follows that
L(t+) L(tj + (QA (t^)) T {g"(t+) - i(tj}
q
A
(t") = ^—= S ^1_^ 21_e 2^L_ (44)
feCtf " 3(t e )
where we have adopted the notation
p (t ) = p (t ),
and (45)
_A, + N -A, + NQ (t ) = q (t ).
When V* is discontinuous at entry to the boundary of the state space with
y = 6(t), it follows from adapting the argument of Berkovitz [1] on
n




(t") = At*), (46)









~ e *v e ~
and
At") = HA (t+) + pB(t
e
). (48)
By (46) through (48) and the non-tangency assumption, it follows that
A-17
.
L(t+) - L(t ) + (P
A
(t+))




{g(tt) " g(t )}A, - % e e ~e ~ e ~ e ~e ** e. ^ e /,o\(t ) = _ . (A9)
g (t ) - 6(t )
n e e
where again we have used (45) . It should be noted that (49) reduces to
(44) when V* is continuous at entry. We may also re-write (46) and (47)












The adjoint equations in the reduced state space may be obtained from
(29) and (30) by use of (28) to eliminate q
A
(t). From (28), we have
3gA 1 /3L ,-A.T &l
3u




Since q (t) is denoted as Q (t) in the reduced state space, this
becomes
A 1 (3L , _A.T 3&) (51)
Using (51) and denoting the adjoint variables in the reduced state space,
(29) may be written as



































L 3v ~ 3v J y
(53)















etc. However, to avoid excessive notation we will not be precise on this
point and hope that the identification of the independent variables when
partial derivatives are to be taken is clear from the context. When
Y Y Y Y
/ \ „ / \ r n n . . n n .
y (t) = 3(t) for t £ t £ t with t < t . , we have
n entry exxt entry exit
Y Y
K " ^^\ = 3(t),U*(t,£)) - hit) for t^try £ t * te^. t ,
except at manifolds of discontinuity of U*(t,z) (i.e. except at the end
points of the interval) . Differentiating the above identity with respect
to x, we obtain
















U- = - — .
3u
(55)
Using (54) and (55) , we may write (52) and (53) as







T £ - {f + (QA ) T ft U*~ 3x ~ dx l du ~ du J X
3f


















-l ,T*<qV- {f + (qV u-~ l du ~ du J "




ft v-l 3v ~ 3v J y (57)
X X XX
CASE (2): x (t ) = o(t) for t
m
<; t <: t
m
.
with t m < t m . .
m entry exit entry exit
We consider the optimal control problem (CPA) in a reduced state
space in which the state variables are x 1 ,...,x ., t y, ,...,y (also1 m-1 1 n
-T -T Tdenoted as z = (x ,y )) and the corresponding adjoint variables are
A Adenoted as P
, Q . Then the system dynamics are given by
x = f(t,x,x =a(t),y,V (t,z)),
rs* r<** **s ni *** **"*
y = g(t,x,x =a(t) ,y,u) ,
**** *^ **** m **»'
_*
with V (t,z) = V*(t,x,x =a(t) ,y) being determined by f (t,x,x =a(t),
*» *^ m ~* m ~ m
y,V (t,z)) = a(t). We also will denote U(t,x,x =a(t) ,y) as U = U(t,z).
~ ~ m





















= for y < B(t)
,
n
:> for y = 3(t)
n
According to the results of Speyer [12], first order necessary conditions





















~ - #w - ~ - l dV ~ dV J X
dX dX dx ~
3f 9g 3f
(<rr . ^ _ (p^i ^r _ (QV -= - {^ + (pV 3v+ n 9 (An)\ (61)~ dy ~ dy ~ dy l dv ~ 3v J y 2 ~
*Nrf A^ *»*/
Using (59) , we may write (60) and (61) for y < £(t) as
n
(PV - - Sk - o^I " . (QA,T !§ . {|L + ( A T »§j
-
3x 3x 3x
















~ 3y ~ 3y
3g
«V ^} 5;9u 3u J
3f








P (t) , and Q (t) are continuous except at manifolds of
r*s r^r
discontinuity of V* and possibly at junctures to the boundary of the
state space with x = a(t). Thus, we also must consider necessary condi-
m
tions for a juncture between an unconstrained subarc and a constrained












»*' e «~ e
X










A (t")a(t ). (65)
e e m e e
This may be written as
L(t ,x,x =a(t^),y,u*(t^),V*(t^,i)) + (PA (t^) )
T
f (t ,x,x =a(t ) ,y^,V*(t^,£)
)
e~m e<^ e e ^ ~e~e~m e **• e ^
+ (Q

















'I' uMtt ) ' V
*







T{f(t ,x,x =a(t ),y,V*(t* i)) - f(t ,x,x =a(t ),y,V*(t" i))}




T {g(t ,x,x =a(t ),Y,u*(t^)) - g(t ,x,x =a(t ),y,u*(t"))} . (67)
~e >^ e ~ m e *~ e ~ e ~ m e*~ e
When the state trajectory does not enter the boundary of the state space
_* _ _
tangentially, we have that f (t ,x,x =a(t ) ,y,V (t ,z)) - a(t ) f 0,
m e ~ m e *" e ~ e
A -
so that (67") may be solved (uniquely) for p (t ) . Then
m e
,
L(t^)-L(t")+ (PA (t^)) T{f(t^)-f(t")}+(QA (t^)) T {g(t^)-g(t")}
A
(t -) =
e e ~ e ~ e ~ e ~ e fc e ~ e
^ gme c , ~\ ' / \
me e
When f (t ) - a(t ) 4 and u*(t ) = u*(t ) (i.e. no manifold of
m e e e e




L(t+ ) - L(t") + (PA (t+))





) = S % 21_^ =!_§ 21_JL_. (69)
m 6
f (O - a(t )me e
_* _ _
When f (t ,x,x = a(t ) ,y,V (t ,z)) - a(t ) = 0, then the junctureme~m e*^ e~ e
A -
conditions (64) and (65) (i.e. (67)) do not determine p (t ).
m e
To summarize, we have for (CPA)
for x (t) > a(t). y (t) < 8(t) almost everywhere in time:
m *-n s
,-A,T 3L , A.T
8
~
, A.T ?fe ; 9L , A.T *\ *(p) - ~ -Z (p) t (q ) "8 \t- + (q ) -T-) U
*- 9x *^ dX ~ X l dU A dU J X
" $ + <£A > T S < • <™>
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3& r3L , A.T 3&, *
(q ) " - a (P ) T7 " (q ) a IT" + ^ ) T~J uoy *~ dy •*- 3y l du ~ du y
Y Y Y Y
for y ., (t) = B(t) for t.
n
<; t s; t
n
. with t n < t n
.
"Hx entry exit entry exit
and x (t) > a(t) almost everywhere in time :
-m-
3x x~ ' 3x(pv .|t. (pv^(QV^-^ + (Qv^u-:
{£*tf>T SK-
(qV . . JL . (pA T H. _ AT !& . {|L + AT % -t
~ .- *»* ~- ~ _-
l du ~ du J y
dy dy 3y ~
#-^ *>^ fw




gv Vi . (73)
X X XX
e- / \ / \ r ni m .,m mfor x (t) = a(t) for t £ t £ t with t < t
m entry exit entry exit
and y(t) < 3(t) almost everywhere in time :




— ~ dX dU «~ dU X






















pA)T ^ ^* (75)l 3v ~ ' 3v J y
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5.2. Necessary Conditions for Control Problem B .
We also consider a minimum problem (denoted as Control Problem B
,
(CPB)) associated with (SPC) . We are to determine v*(t) = V*(t,x,y) such
that the following holds:
minimize {G(T,x(T) ,y (T) ) +
v(t)
L(t,z,U*(t,x,y) ,v)dt},
subject to: x = f(t,x,y,v), (CPB)
r** *>* r*~> *»*/
y = g(t,x,y,U*(t,x,y)),
v(t) is unrestricted scalar control variable,
x (t) :> a(t) and y (t) <: B(t) for all t £ [0,T],
m n
with scalar terminal condition F (t ,x, (T) ,y (T) ) = 0.
For (CPB) we assume that the first time derivative of x (t)
m
explicitly contains the control variable v and that (x ) = f (t,x,y,v)
m v m ~ ~
v
^ along an optimal trajectory. Let us note that in (CPB) we have
(y ) =0. Thus, variations in the control v have no direct influence
n v
on a trajectory for which y (t) = $(t). Let us recall that we have
assumed that in (DG) the first time derivative of y (t) explicitly con-
n
tains the strategic variable u and that (y ) = g (t,x,y,u) ^ along
n u n "w ~
u
an optimal trajectory. Thus, in (CPB) we will have (since in (CPB) y (t)
* +£ B(t) is a "rule of the game") y = g (t,x,y,U*(t ,x,y)) £ 3(t) when
n n *+* **•> **•> ***
y (t) = 6(t) where g (t ) denotes a right hand limit.
There are two cases to be considered in developing necessary condi-
tions of optimality for (CPB)
:
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(1) y (t) < 3(t) almost everywhere in time,
n
Y Y Y Y
(2) y (t) = B(t) for t
n £ t <; t n . with t n < t n . .
n entry exit entry exit
CASE (1): Y n (t) < &(t) almost everywhere in time .









g(t,z,U*(t,z)) - n,(t){x -a(t)}, (76)
.— ^~ — *** i m
where
,










$ B (T,z(T),a B ) = G(T,x(T),y(T)) + aBF(T,x(T) ,y(T) ) . (77)
According to the results of Speyer [12], first order necessary conditions
o f optimality for (CPB ) are as follows:
37" = ° ° r 37











(P ) ~ "5 (P ) a (^ ) a IT" + (cl > T7J Uv + n i (A > » (79)*- 3x *- 3x ~ 3x l 3u ~ 3u J x 1 <~
e+* ^ *** *^










(q ) - •;— (p ) a— (q ) a— IT" + ^ ) T~J U„' ( 8°)
~ 3y *~ 3y A 3y l 3u ~ 3u J y
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(i } where v i (81)
'










^k- V2^)T Whe- ^2 (82)H for y
n
(T) = B(T),
B 3$ B* B»
H
D
(T) + ~- + v*a(T) + v!Jb(T) = 0. (83)
We also have the minimum principle
H
B (U*(t,z),v) £ HB (U*(t,z),v*). (84)
R R R
H
, p (t) , and q (t) are continuous except at manifolds of discontinuity
of \J* , where for all differentials dt, dx, dy along the manifold
/nB+
, T B— N , / B+ B—.T , . B+ B— . T , _. /nr\(H -H )dt - (p -p ) dx - (q -q ) dy = 0. (85)
When x (t) > a(t) almost everywhere in time, the above becomes
m
(except at manifolds of discontinuity)
£ + (£,B > T 1 * °> < 86 >
(pV - - f- - (PB ) T 1 - (qV '£ - {f + (,V UJ1 0* (87)~ 3x ~ 3x ~ 3x L 3u ~ 3u J x
0** r*s *** *>*f
,-B.T 9L , B.T
31
, B.T
3& r 9L , B.T 3gi * /Qa *(q ) - - -r (p ) t (q ) t hr + (q ) t42-} u . (88)
~ 9y *- 9y ~ 9y l 9u «* 9u J y
Using (86), we may write the adjoint equations as
.•B.T 3L , B.T
31 , B.T 3^ r9L , B.T 3^ *
(p ) = - 1 (p ) 1 (q ) T |t- + (q ) — } U*~ 9x ~ 9x ~ 9x l 9u * 9u J x
/*»* /-v/ ^w
- {t±+ (pV-Jt! v* . < 89 >L 3v ~ 3v J x
r^
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3& ,9L , B.T 3 &o *
(q ) - - -r- - (p ) =- - (q ) t- - (t- + (q ) t-} U
~ dy ~ dy ~ dy l du **» du J y
*>* ^N/ ^W ^
X X XX
When x (t) a(t) for t m £ t £ r m . with t m < t m . .
m entry exit entry exit
we
may reduce the dimension of the state space and also the adjoint variable
space (see [17]). Let us adopt the following notation
p
T
- CrP2'""Vi) ' Q
T
- (Qr Q2 ,....Qn).
-T -T
£ = (f 1 ,f 2 ,...,fm_1 ), x = (x1 ,x2 ,...,xm_1),
U = U(t,z) = U(t,x,x =a(t),y).
~ *^ m ~






, y , . . . ,y , and the corresponding adjoint variables are de-
R R
noted as P
, Q . When U* is continuous at entry to the boundary of
the state space with x = a(t), the corner conditions at such junctures
x
m
to this reduced state space are (for example, at entry with t = t )r
e entry
















Assuming that the optimal path is not tangent to the boundary of the state
_ •
space at entry to the constrained subarc (i.e. f (t ) - a(t ) ^ 0) , itJ m e e
follows that
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L(T + ) - L(t ) + P
B
(t
+)){f(t + ) - f(t )}d.-s e e ~ e ~ e ~ e
P (t ) = ;me r / ~\ / \
f (t ) - a(t )me e
where we have adopted the notation
„B, + N -B, +,
I (t e }
=
I (t e } >
and (95)
_B, +, B. +.
a (te >
= & (te >'
When U* is discontinuous at entry to the boundary of the state space
with x = a(t), it follows from adapting the argument of Berkovitz [1]
m
on discontinuous "right-hand sides" to the usual development of the corner
conditions (see [24])
Z^e^ = £B(t e+) + ^ (%)
q
B














) + pa(t ). (98)
e e e
By (96) through (98) and the non-tangency assumption, it follows that
_ L(t^)-L(t")+(P B (t^)) T {f(t+)-f(t")}+(QB (t^)) T{g(t^)-g(t")}











where again we have used (95) . It should be noted that (99) reduces to
(94) when U* is continuous at entry. We may also re-write (96) and (97)
(or (91) and (92)) as
P (t
e




B / — N „B . + N
q (t ) = Q (t ).
~ e ~ e
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The adjoint equations in the reduced state space may be obtained from (79)
u
and (80) by use of (78) to eliminate p (t). From (78), we have
m





" 3f~ ^ + (E } 3^
m
3v





Since p (t) is denoted as P (t) in the reduced state space, this
becomes





Using (101) and denoting the adjoint variables in the reduced state space,




















+— . Jit + (p
B T ~




































etc. However, to avoid excessive notation we will not be precise on this
point and hope that the identification of the independent variables when





x (t) = a(t) for t S^t £ t ***. with t < t "'
. ,
we have
m entry exit entry exit
X X
x = f (t,x,x =a(t) ,y,V (t,z)) = a(t) for t £ t £ t ,
m in ~ m ~ ~ entry exit
-* -
except at manifolds of discontinuity of V (t,z) (i.e. except at the end
points of the interval) . Differentiating the above identity with respect












































B T % -
~ »- ~ „- ~ _- l 3u ~ du J x3x dx 3x *~
rv* #N^ *^
(qV . . |L _ B T H. _ B T !§ _ {|i + (QB,T !&} -
~ 3y ~ 3y ~ 3y l 3u ~ 3u J y
3f




irl v* • do?)L 3v ~ 3v J y
Y Y Y Y
CASE (2): y (t) = B(t) for t
n £ t £ t n . with t n < t n . .
•Hx— entry exit entry exxt
We consider the optimal control problem (CPB) in a reduced state
space in which the state variables are x 1 , . . . ,x ,y n ,...,y 1 (also denoted1 ml n—
1
-T T -T
as z = (x ,y )) and the corresponding adjoint variables are denoted as
R R
P
, Q . Then the system dynamics are given by
***^ *^
x = f(t,x,y,y =6(t),v),
rs/ r+s r** ***> XX




with U (t,z) = U*(t,x,y,y =3(t)) being determined by g (t,x,y,y =3(t),
~ ~ ^ n n~~n
—A
U (t,z)) = B(t). We also will denote V(t,x,y,y =B(t)) as V = V(t,z).

















g(t,x,y,y =3(t),U*(t,z)) - n (t){x -a(t) } ,







for x > a(t)
,
m
^ for x = a(t)
.
m
According to the results of Speyer [12], first order necessary conditions
of optimality for (CPB) in CASE (2) are as follows:











|i + ( B T % g* + - . I











B T ft ?
j~ - ~ - -
l du ~ du y
3y 3y 3y ~














' 9x ~ ; 3x VX ' 3x i3u ~ 3u J x
/V ^W A^ ^W
- it + <L
B
>










|L ; B T |£} g*
~ „- ~ ~-
l 3u ~ 3u J y





P (t) , and Q (t) are continuous except at manifolds of
discontinuity of U* and possibly at junctures to the boundary of the
state space with y = B(t). Thus, we also must consider necessary condi-
tions for a juncture between an unconstrained subarc and a constrained
A-33
subarc on the boundary. The results of Speyer and Bryson [17] tell us
that
t^B , +. B , — v
I (t e >
=
? (t e } '
and (114)
^B . +> —B , —
.
Q (t ) = q (t ),
~ e ~ e
Y







(t ) - q
B
(t )3(t ). (115)
e e n e e
This may be written as
L(t ,x,£,y -3(t ),U*(t+ z),v*(tt)) + (PB (t+)) Tf(t ,x,£,y =3(t ),v*(t+))







,x,y,y =3(t ),U*(t^,z)) = L(t ,x,y,y =B(t ),U*(t ,z),v*(t ))





f(t ,x,y,y =0(t ),v*(t )) + (qB (t ))
T
g(t x,y,y =3(t ),U*(t,z))
~ e «~ e ~ ^ n e e ~ e »>» e ~ ~ n e ~
-q




B (t"){g (t ,x,y,y =3 (t ) ,U* (t~ z) ) - 3(t )} =nenen e e ~ e
L(t x,y,y =3(t ) ,U*(t+ z) ,v*(t+)) - L(t ,x ,y ,y =3 (t ) ,U*(t ,z) ,v*(t ))
e ~ ~ n e e ^ e e ~ ~ n e e ^ e
+ (P




T{g(t ,x,y,y =3(t ),U*(t
+
,z))-g(t ,x,y,y = 3(t ),U*(t ,z))}. (117)r^e ^^e*^^^n e e *»* e^^n c e ^
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When the state trajectory does not enter the boundary of the state space
—* — — •
tangentially, we have that g (t ,x,y,y =B(t),U (t ,z)) - 3(t ) ± 0, so
n e ^ *~ n e ~ e
that (117) may be solved (uniquely) for q (t ) . Then •
n e
L(t^)-L(t")+(P B (t^)) T{f(t^)-f(t")}+(QB (t+ )) T{i(t^)-i(t")}
q
B
(t") = ^ 5 = § ^_§ S ~ e & e ~ e ^ (ng)
n 6
g (t ) - B(t )
n e e
- • +
When g (t ) - 3(t ) f and v*(t ) (i.e. no manifold of discontinuitynee e
of V* at entry to reduced state space)
,
(118) becomes
L(t+) - L(t") + (Q
B (t^)) T{g(t^) - i(t")}B.- N e e ~ e ~ e ~ e








When g (t ,x,y,y = 3(t ) ,U (t ,z)) - 3(t ) = 0, then the juncture condi-
n e «~ *-' n e e ~ e
R —
tions (114) and (115) (I.e. (117)) do not determine q (t )
.
n e
To summarize, we have for (CPB)
for x (t) > a(t), y (t) < 3(t) almost everywhere in time:m *—n - "
,-B T 3L , B.T
91 , B.T 9& r8L , B.T 9% *
(P ) - "5 (P ) a (q ) TZ = XT' + (<1 ) T~J U
~ 3x ~ dx ~ dx l du ~ du X
- if + <PV S Vx • <1M >
,-3.T 3L - B.T




£i TT*(q ) = ~ 7 (P ) a (^ ) a IT" + (^ ) T~J U





ill V* ' < 121 >1 9v ~ 3v J y
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n nfor y (t) = B(t) for t «£ t ^ t ". with t ' t
—ti entry = exit entry exit
and x (t) > a(t) almost everywhere in time:
nv -— .... ..-— . . ., - .* .,--- .———- -— -,— -
-m-
;B,T 3L /T.B N T
91 ^B V T<pV - - j£ - (pV 5= - (qV ? - {f + (QB ) T ^} C*~ 3x ~ 3x ~ 3x l du ~ 3u J x
^ **^ *-^
3f


















B) I !&, -
~ - ~ — ~ — du ~ du y
3y 3y 3y ~
&S «W M
X X XX
,. /\/\^ m m #1 m mfor x (t) = a(t) for t £. t £ t with t < t
m entry exit entry exit















B T g £
~ „- ~ ~- *** »- du ~ dU X













B,T !| - (QB)T !§ . ilk + (QB)T ^} C*vii ; 3y ~ ' 3y v*i 3y l 3u ~ 3u J y
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5.3. Equivalence of Multipliers in the Two Problems .




q and p , q satisfy the same differential equations (appropriately
modified on the boundary of the state space) . In order to complete the
proof of the equivalence of these multipliers it remains to show that
they take on the same terminal values and possess the same continuity
properties (both interior to and on the boundary of the state space)
.
Thus, it remains to discuss
(1) terminal values of the adjoint variables,
(2) continuity of the adjoint variables across manifolds of discon-
tinuity of strategies at interior point of state space,
(3) juncture conditions at boundary of state space.
5.3.1. Terminal Values of the Adjoint Variables .
For (CPA), there are several distinct cases that must be considered
CASE (Al) : x„,(T) > ct(T), y (T) < g(T) .
m e—ti
From (31) , (32) , and (33) we have
(^m)I.J» +aA 3F3x(T) " 3x(T) '
(,
A
(T)) T = r^v + a
A 9F
9y(T) " 3y(T) •
L + (p
A
(T)) T f + (q
A (T» Tg+ || + a
A f =0.

























where I denotes an m x m identity matrix. It should be recalled that
we have assumed that the optimal path is not tangent to the terminal mani-
fold. This non-tangency assumption (see [3] or [15]) yields that there is
a unique solution to equations (126)
.
X







< T and y (T) < g(T) .
—entry "ti






















g + |f + a
A
|f =0.




































Again, the non-tengency assumption yields that there is a unique solution
to equations (127)
.
It should be pointed out that there are two ways in which we may
think of equations (127) as arising:
(a) the usual transversality conditions in a reduced state space in
which the state variables are x, x , ,y, , . . . ,y ,
1 m-1 1 n
(b) the usual transversality conditions in the original state space.
Let us now show that (a) and (b) are equivalent. By (31) through (33),
we have in the original state space in which the state variables are







A /mNX T 9G A 8F A. m.T ,., „ ON
<£.
(T))
"Jim + a Sgj!^i f«» • (128)
AT 9G A 9F






(T) + ff- + v^a(T) = 0. (130)
We may write the last equation as
aAT AT 9<t> A*
L + (p (T))
i
f + (q (T))
X
g +^r+ v a(T) = 0.
















g +# + l^fi- - p*(T)}i(T) - 0.
m















Let us recall that x = a(t) for t m <: t £ T. Thus, we have
m entry
dx X
m — — ** — • m
-r— = f (t,x,x =a(t),y,V (t,z)) - a(t) for t f < t aC T,at m ~ m ~ ~ entry
or
f - a(T) = 0. (132)
m
Using (132) , we then obtain from (131) that
L + (£W! + (a* (T))\ + !£ + ^»i.£ (I) -o. ("3)
m





m-l' yl'"" yn ( ° r l> I} ' We haV£
(**L) = fl*l) + f-i*i-] . ^ ( T )
^3T J - ^3T ' ^x (TV - dt '
x(T),y(T) di x(T),y(T) dXmU; T,x(T),y(T)
rw *«w *"w As^ *w Aw
since on the constrained subarc we have x = x (t) . Hence, in the reduced
m m
state space (133) becomes
L+ (pA (T)) Tf + (q\T))V (|^) =0.


















*«w Aw *w Aw












*«w Aw /%* /n*
we see that (127) follows from (128), (129), and (134).
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y (T) < g,(T) .
"TT
In this case we essentially have an additional terminal constraint








T =^+aA ^--vVV'3x(T) 3x(T) 1
,
A /m , N T 3G A 3F




T£+ (qA(T))\+|f + aA || + vAa(T) =








































The non-tangency assumption implies that equations (135) have a unique



















Hence, the terminal multipliers p (T) , q (T) , a depend (continuously)
on a single parameter, v
1
. The value of this parameter, however, cannot
be determined from the transversality conditions but must be determined
by considerations "in the large" (see Section 7.3 of [5]). The parameter's
value is chosen so that the system is steered to the given terminal state
(see [25] for corresponding one-sided (optimal control) problem). Thus
A
v n is chosen so that x (T) = a(T) but x (t) > a(t) for t 6 (T-6.T).
1 mm
OTHER CASES . These are treated analogously to the above.
For (CPB)
,
there are again several distinct cases that must be
considered. It should be recalled (see Section 4 above) that the optimal
path is not tangent to the terminal manifold.
CASE (Bl): x_(T) > q(T), y..(T) < 3(T)
m * *-n































Again, the non-tangency assumption yields that (116) has a unique solution.





(T) , a and p (T)
,
R R
q (T) , a satisfy the same set of equations which have a unique solution.












CASE (B2) : x (T) = a(T) with x (t) = a (t) for t £_t£T_ with




_y (T) < B(T).
—entry -"a **—-



























Again, the non-tangency assumption in the reduced state space yields that
(138) has a unique solution.












Q (T) , a satisfy the same set of equations which have a unique solution












a = a . (139)
CASE (B3): x (T) = ct(T) but x (t) > q(t) for t £ (T-6 ,T) and
-TTT -m
y (T) < 3(T) .Tl
In the necessary conditions of optimality for (CPB) , we have v ^ 0,

























3? " V la(T) t=T (140)
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Again, the non-tangency assumption yields that (140) has a unique solution








q (t) = S (v ),
B VB. B N
° = 1 (v1 )
As was the case for (CPA) , the value of v cannot be determined by the
transversality conditions at t = T but is determined by considerations
"in the large."
In this third case, the problem essentially behaves as though it
had two terminal equality constraints. With more than one terminal equality









a = a . (141)
This type of qualification was apparently first noted by Schmitendorf and
Citron [16]. We have not been able to prove (141) for differential games
with p > 1 (where p = the number of terminal equality constraints) (nor
has anybody else apparently). However, it seems plausible that (141) holds.
Let us elaborate about the plausibility of (141) . In (CPA) we have
V*(t,x,y) given, and we determine u*(t) = U*(t,x,y); while in (CPB) we
have U*(t,x,y) given, and we determine v*(t) = V*(t,x,y). Thus, in
.— ~ *<* t**
both problems we have the same optimal strategies U*(t,x,y) and ^*^ t
'^X)'
T T
For a given initial point
^^niYn^ we can fi-nd the same optimal trajectory
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(x*(t) ,y*(t) ) for ^ t ^ T in both problems. Hence, we would expect
to be able to find the same multipliers (they may not be unique) in both
problems, since we have the same adjoint equations, transversality conditions
(as well as system dynamics), and optimal trajectories in both problems.AAA B B B
p (T) , q (T) , a and p (T) , q (T) , a satisfy the same equations
(135) and (140) (provided that we equate \>A with v?) . If p
B (T), q
B (T),
1 1 ~ ~
a is not unique, we will agree to pick it so that (141) holds.
OTHER CASES . These are treated analogously to the above.
Thus, we have shown that (137) holds in CASE (1) and (139) in CASE
(2) . In cases like CASE (3) , our results apply to differential games in
which (141) (or the equivalent) holds.
5.3.2. Continuity of the Adjoint Variables Across Manifolds of Discontinuity
of Strategies at Interior Point of State Space .
Let M(t,x,y) = define the manifold of discontinuity and t,
denote the time at which this manifold is reached along a particular
trajectory. Assuming that the optimal path is not tangent to any manifold
of discontinuity at an interior point of the state space, standard argu-
ments (see [3] or [15]) in which the manifold of discontinuity M plays









Again, the non-tangency assumption yields that (140) has a unique solution
which we denote as
B, . B, B,






* = I (v
x
).
As was the case for (CPA) , the value of v cannot be determined by the
transversality conditions at t = T but is determined by considerations
"in the large."
In this third case, the problem essentially behaves as though it
had two terminal equality constraints. With more than one terminal equality










A B /1/1Na = a . (141)
This type of qualification was apparently first noted by Schmitendorf and
Citron [16] . We have not been able to prove (141) for differential games
with p > 1 (where p = the number of terminal equality constraints) (nor
has anybody else apparently). However, it seems plausible that (141) holds.
Let us elaborate about the plausibility of (141) . In (CPA) we have
V*(t,x,y) given, and we determine u*(t) = U*(t,x,y); while in (CPB) we
have U*(t,x,y) given, and we determine v*(t) = V*(t,x,y). Thus, in
both problems we have the same optimal strategies U*(t,x,y) and V*(t,x,y).
T T
For a given initial point (^jyn) we can finc* the same optimal trajectory
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(x* (t) ,y* (t) ) for ^ t £ T in both problems. Hence, we would expect
to be able to find the same multipliers (they may not be unique) in both
problems, since we have the same adjoint equations, transversality conditions
(as well as system dynamics), and optimal trajectories in both problems.AAA R R R
p (T) , q (T) , a and p (T) , q (T) , a satisfy the same equations
(135) and (140) (provided that we equate \h with v?) . If p
B (T), q
B (T),
1 1 <~ ««-
o is not unique, we will agree to pick it so that (141) holds.
OTHER CASES . These are treated analogously to the above.
Thus, we have shown that (137) holds in CASE (1) and (139) in CASE
(2) . In cases like CASE (3) , our results apply to differential games in
which (141) (or the equivalent) holds.
5.3.2. Continuity of the Adjoint Variables Across Manifolds of Discontinuity
of Strategies at Interior Point of State Space .
Let M(t,x,y) = define the manifold of discontinuity and t
denote the time at which this manifold is reached along a particular
trajectory. Assuming that the optimal path is not tangent to any manifold
of discontinuity at an interior point of the state space, standard argu-
ments (see [3] or [15]) in which the manifold of discontinuity M plays
the role of the terminal manifold then yield
A/
-v B, -N
E (td } £ (V>
and (142)
A / "x B /-x
s^V = s, (d } -
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If M is a manifold of discontinuity for only U* , then in (CPA)
the usual corner conditions at an interior point of the state space yield
A. -v A. + N






q (t ) = q (t ).
«~ a ~ a
Similarly, if M is a manifold of discontinuity for only V*, then in
(CPB) the usual corner conditions at an interior point of the state space
yield
B , - , B , +.
z (V - z (V»
and (144)
B / - \ B / + x
If M is a manifold of discontinuity of both U* and V*
,
then
we have, for example, in (CPA) that [1] for all differentials dt,, dx,
d ~











)-qA (t^)} TdI = 0. (145)
5.3.3. Juncture Conditions at Boundary of State Space .
Let us consider the juncture conditions which must hold between the
adjoint variables at the entrance to a constrained subarc on which x (t) =
X X X X
f*(t) for t 6 [t ,t . with t < t . . Other cases are
entry exit entry exit
x
similarly treated. We denote t as t .
entry e





>»< e ~ e
q





(t ) - p
A
(t )a(t) = HA(tV (148)
e m e e e
Assuming that the optimal trajectory does not enter the boundary of the
state space tangentially




L(t+) - L(t") + (PA (t^)) T{f(t+ ) - f(t~)} + (Q
A
(t^)) T {g(t^) - g(t")}
A, - x e e ~e«~e~e ~ e ~ e ~ e
p ( t ) = _me r / ~\ / \
f (t ) - a(t )me e
When there is no manifold of discontinuity of U* at entry to the reduced
state space, the above further simplifies to
,










) = £ S 2^-J! 21_£ 21_fL_. (150)
m e
f
m<0 - »(t )e e
For (CPB) we have shown that (for a first order SVIC) assuming that
the optimal trajectory is not tangent to the boundary of the state space






~ e <~ e
R L(t+) - L-(t") + (P
B
(t+))
T{f(t~Vf(t+)} + (QB (t^)) T{g(0-g(t")}o,-\ e e ~ e ~ e ~ e ~e X/ e ~ e /n








^ e *+> e
When there is no manifold of discontinuity of U* at entry to the reduced
state space, equation (152) further simplifies to
A-4 7
-





p» (t ;> .
_<= ~ e ~ e ~_^_W - .(t.)
—B +In the original state space we have (recall that we denote p (t ) as
R +
P (t ) , etc., in the reduced state space) when U* is continuous at
entry
B, - N B. +,
I ^ = I Cte),
and (155)
B, -
x B. + s
~ e ~ e
The above yield that when £ (t) = p (t) and q (t) = q (t) for
t < t £ T, it follows that provided the optimal trajectory is not tangent
to the boundary of the state space at a juncture point
A,
-v B, - N






*~ e ~ e
A B5.3.4. Equivalence of the Adjoint Variables X (t) and X (t)
.
* W ^ jg S
















and similarly for X (t) . The equivalence of X (t) and X (t) follows
from the facts that
A B
(1) on the terminal manifold we have X (T) = X (T)
,
(2) as we work backwards from the terminal manifold to the first
manifold of discontinuity, both XA (t) and XB(t) satisfy the
same differential equation so that' xA(t) = X^(t) for t < t £ T
where t.. denotes the time closest to T such that either U*
or V* is discontinuous,
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(3) working backwards across the first manifold of discontinuity,
we have X (t..) = X (t,),
~ 1 <N» i
(4) in this manner one works backwards across each manifold of dis-
continuity and shows that X (t) = X (t) for <; t £ T.
Thus, (70) through (75), (120) through (125), (37), (139), (141), (142),
and (156) yield that







q (t) = q (t).
6 . A Problem with More General Dynamics .
The above development also applies to the following problem (denoted
as "Problem II") with slightly more general system dynamics.
Problem II.
T
maximize minimize {G(T,w(T) ,x(T)











u(t) , v(t) are unrestricted (scalar) strategic variables,
w(t) ^ a(t) for all t 6 [0,T] (scalar state variable
inequality constraints)
,
y(t) <; B(t) for all t 6 [0,T]
with scalar terminal condition F (T ,w(T) ,x(T) ,y (T) ) = 0,
*
Considering the results of Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, we see that the subse-
quent statement applies whether the manifold of discontinuity lies interior
to the state space or on the boundary.
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where we assume that all functions are smooth enough to insure the existence
of all partial derivatives required. In Problem II above, x is an n-
vector of state variables.
It will be convenient to denote the vector of state variables as
T T
z = (w,x ,y) - (w,x ,x ,...,x ,y)
.
~ ~ l z n





Before we state necessary conditions of optimality for Problem II,
let us state the assumptions that we make for Problem II:
(1) the differential game has value and a saddle point in pure
strategies
,
(2) the solution to Problem II is normal (see [ 1 ])
,
(3) the optimal path is not tangent to the terminal manifold or to
any manifold of discontinuity of U* or V* or to the boundary
of the state space at entry to a constrained subarc which lies
on the boundary,
(4) to insure the existence of value for the differential game we
assume**
(a) L(t,z,y,v) = L (t,z,u) + L (t,z,v),
(b) g(t,z,u,v) = g (t,z,u) + g (t,z,v),
(5) the first time derivative of y(t) explicitly contains the strategic
variable u and that (y) = h (t,w,x,y,u) ^ along an optimal
trajectory; we further assume that (y) = 0, i.e. h does not
depend on v at all,
*
The development of these necessary conditions is similar to that for
Problem I.
**
As noted above, several other technical conditions must be satisfied to
guarantee the existence of value and of a saddle point in pure strategies
to Problem II (see Chapter 6 of [9]).
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(6) the first time derivative of w(t) explicitly contains the
strategic variable v and that (w) = f (t,w,x,y,v) ^ along
an optimal trajectory; we further assume that Tw) = 0, i.e.
f does not depend on u at all.
Now we define
T
H(t,z,P,n,u,v) = L(t,z,u,v) + Xf (t,z,v) + p g(t,z,u,v)
+ qh(t,z,u) - ni (t){w-a(t)} - n 9 (t){y-(3(t)}, (159)
where
,
= for w < a(t)
,






= for y < 3(t),
;> for y = 6(t),
and
*(T,z(T),ff) = G(T,w(T),x(T),y(T)) + aF(T,w(T) ,x(T)
,y (T) ) . (160)
In order that the strategy pair (U*,V*) be a saddle point of the criterion
functional it is necessary that there exist unique functions X(t), p(t),
q(t)
,
r\ (t) , and n ? (t) and constants a, v , and v such that the
following conditions hold
3H
_ 3L . T ~ oh n /i ti \t— =0 or — + p — + q — = 0, (161)dU 3u ~ 3u du
3H A 3L 3f T ~ _ /Tcn\t— =0 or — + X — + p — = 0, (162)3v 3v 3v ~ 3v
-X=H =T~ +X ^— + P ^~ +cl^ H, , (163)w 3w 3w ~ 3w 3w 1
In other words, we assume that w(t) ^ a(t) and y(t) ^ 3(t) are the
appropriate types of first order SVIC's.
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•T „ 3L , 3f T
3
~ 3h
-p - H = — + X— + p 1 — + q ~, (164)
~ x 3x dx ox 3x
„ 3L ,3f T
3&
,
3h /n ^ CN
-q = H = — + X— +p — + q n_, (165)




= for w(T) > a(T)
,
3w(T) 1 "*"" = v i ) *VW '^0 for w(T) =a(T), (166)
a$ /
= for y(T) < 3(T),
q(T) =
sTTtT " v 2 where V 2 )YU; '^0 for y(T) - B(T), (168)
H(T) + H - vxo(T) - v 2 3(T) = 0. (169)
Analogous to the Weierstrass condition, we also have the max-min principle
H(u,v*) £ H(u*,v*) <;H(u*,v), (170)
which holds for all admissible u and v. H, X(t), p(t) , and q(t)
are continuous functions except at manifolds of discontinuity of both U*
and V*, where for all differentials dt, dw, dx, dy along the manifold
(H
+
-H~)dt - (X+-X~)dw - (£
+
-£~) Tdx - (q
+
-q")dy = 0. (171)
In other words, at both entrances to and exits from constrained
subarcs on the boundary of the state space , we have
X (0 = *<£>. £(0 = £<t+), q(t") = q(t+), (172)
and





It should be recalled that this statement must be modified for an absorbing
state boundary.
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except possibly at manifolds of discontinuity of both U* and V*,
where all the dual variables are continuous except those corresponding
to w or y which describes the boundary.
The above first order necessary conditions of optimality for
Problem II are analogous to the optimal control theory results of Jacobson,
Lele, and Speyer [12] . These results may also be written in a form
analogous to that of optimal control theory results of Berkovitz [2] and
Gamkrelidze (see Chapter VI in [14]). This is done by introducing new
multipliers A(t) such that
X(t) = A
1
(t) - u 1
(t), (174)






It is well known that we may then make the following identifications
n
i
(t) = - u
t
(t) for i = 1,2. (177)
7
.
A More General Type of State Variable Inequality Constraint .
It is of considerable interest and import to consider a more general








subject to: x = f(t,x,y,v),
maximize minimize {G(T ,x(T)




/W 0S* tfS^ *N*
u(t) , v(t) are unrestricted (scalar) strategic variables,









with scalar terminal condition F(T,x(T) ,y^(T) ) = 0,
where we assume that all functions are smooth enough to insure the existence
of all partial derivatives required. In Problem III above, x is an m-
vector of state variables, and y is an n-vector of state variables.
It will again be convenient to adopt the notational conventions (6) and
(7).
We again make the assumptions (1) through (3) given in Section 6
above and modify (4) through (6) as follows:
(4) to insure the existence of value for the differential game we
assume L(t,z,u,v) = L (t,z,u) + L (t,z,v),
~ 1 <~ z ~
(5) the first time derivative of C (t,y(t)) explicitly contains the
strategic variable u and that (C„) (t,x,y,u(t)) ^ along an
optimal trajectory; we further assume that (C„) = —r J J 2 v 3v
E 0, i.e. C does not depend on v at all.
(6) the first time derivative of C (t,x(t)) explicitly contains
1 ***
the strategic variable v and that (C ) (t,x,y,v(t)) ^ along
/*-• r^>





tt~ =0, i.e. C. does not depend on u at all8u 3t 8x ~
A-54
Unfortunately, it is not convenient to develop necessary conditions
for Problem III in the same manner in which they were developed for
Problem I. We will now state necessary conditions of optimality for
Problem III. Although a proof has been developed for these conditions,
it will be given elsewhere in the future, since it is rather lengthy.
First we define
T
H(t,z,p,q,n ,u,v) = L(t,z,u,v) + p f(t,x,y,v)
<-w r^> y-w r*~>
+ q
T
g(t,x,y,u) - n (t)C (t,x) - n (t)C (t,y), (178)
where for i = 1,2
n±
(t)
= for (-1) C. £ 0,
;> for C. = 0,
x
and
*(T,z(T),a) = G(T,x(T),y(T)) + aF(T,x(T) ,y(T) )
.
(179)
In order that the strategy pair (U*,V*) be a saddle point of the
criterion functional it is necessary that there exist unique functions
p(t), q(t), rii (t) , and ru(t) and constants v, , v_ , and a such
*»» »v ± Z 1 z
that the following conditions hold
|^-0 or |L + qT -~= 0, (180)dU dU ~ dU
9f









'I =\=J^ Z JZ + 1 te - n i IT
»
(182)










+ a S7 - VaT- (183)
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xr /
= for C (T,x(T)) > 0,
z <T > ^en -
v
i mt) where v i {
,
(184)









q (T ) = ,„?t^
_ vo ,,,/t^ where v < (185)3y(T) 2 3y(T) 2
:> for C.(T,y(T)) = 0,
3C 3C
H(T) + H + vi ir + v2 *r = - < 186 >
Analogous to the Weierstrass condition, we also have the max-min principle
(18). H, p(t), and q(t) are continuous functions except at manifolds
of discontinuity of both U* and V*, where for all differentials dt,
dx, dy along the manifold (19) holds.
The above first order necessary conditions of optimality for Problem
III are analogous to the optimal control theory results of Jacobson, Lele,
and Speyer . These results may also be written in a form analogous to that
of optimal control theory results of Berkovitz and Gamkrelidze. This is




pj(t) - Xj(t) - ^(t) ^ ,
~
(187)
T T 2V(t) -jg<t> -y2 (t) jf .
It is well known that we may then make the identifications (25)
.
As should be clear to the reader, Problem I is a special case of
Problem III. However, the development of necessary conditions of optimality
for Problem III is much more tedious and not the same as for Problem I.
The development of these more general conditions will be given in the
future.
It should again be recalled that this statement must be modified for an
absorbing state boundary.
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8 . Further Extensions .
There are two directions of import in which the above results may
be extended:
(a) additional inequality constraints on the strategies,
(b) higher order SVIC's.
It is of interest to consider a problem (denoted as "Problem IV")
similar to Problem or Problem II in which there are additional inequality
constraints on the (vector) strategies U and V.
Problem IV.











u(t) is p-vector of strategic variables which satisfies
u(t) £ ft
U (t,w,x,y) for all t
€
[0,T],




V (t,w,x,y) for all t 6 [0,T],
w(t) * a(t) for all t
€
[0,T] (scalar ^^ variable
y(t) * 3(t) for all t
€
[0,T] inequality constraints),
with scalar terminal condition F(T,w(T) ,x(T) ,y (T) ) = 0,
where





= {v I R(t,w,x,y,v) ^ 0}.
It is a straightforward matter to combine the previous development
of Berkovitz [3] with our development for Problem I to develop necessary
conditions of optimality for Problem IV. Our applications of the results
of this appendix will be to Lanchester-type differential games of this
form (see equations (1) above)
.
Another extension of import is the extension of our results on
differential games with SVIC's to problems with higher order SVIC's.
Similar one-sided optimization problems have arisen in our study of
Lanchester-type optimal control problems [26] (see also [23]). Therefore,








subject to: x, = f
n
(t,x 1 ,x ),#vi ~l_ ~i ~z
where
52
= & (t »5i'52»XiL'X2«v) «
£2
=
fc (t »5i»52'Xi«&»u) »
u(t), v(t) are unrestricted (scalar) strategic variables,
C^t,^) * for all t
€
[0.T] (gcalar state variable
C (t,y_ ) ^ for all t 6 [0,T] inequality constraints),
with scalar terminal condition F(T,x(T) ,y (T) ) = 0,
——— 0-*, +•*,





) and L = (Ll>L2 )
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We make the following assumptions about C (t,x
n ) in Problem V:
k k k
(1) (C.) = for k = l,...,p-l where (C. ) = ^~ ,
1 V 1 dt
(2) the first derivative of C. (t ,x.. (t) ) which explicitly contains
th
the strategic variable v in the p—- and (C. ) ^ along
an optimal trajectory,
(3) (C ) = for k = 1,2,... (i.e. for all integers k £ 1)
.
Similar assumptions are made about C (t,y,).. Other assumptions that are
Z ~1
required in the development of necessary conditions are similar to those
made in previous sections. The results of Jacobson, Lele, and Speyer
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APPENDIX B: A Differential Game Model for the Study of Optimal Air-War
Strategies
.
1 . Introduction .
An important question for defense planners is what are appropriate
missions over the course of a tactical campaign for tactical air power.
The answer to this question has far reaching implications for Navy air
forces (both carrier-based and land-based) (and, of course, the Air Force).
The quest for an answer to this type of question has been in large part
the genesis of modern quantitative methods of military analysis. One has
only to recall the classical work of Lanchester [10] or that reported in
Morse and Kimball [11] (see especially pp. 73-77). More recently, the
USAF Studies and Analysis Group has been using quantitative methodology
[24] in trying to answer such questions.
There are many analysis approaches to answering the question of
the "best"role (over time) of tactical air support. These range from
operational gaming (see [12] or [23] for discussion of terminology and
background) to analytical solution of an idealized differential game.
However, as pointed out by L. Berkovitz and M. Dresher (see p. 612 of [1]),
"operational gaming is not a helpful device for solving a game or getting
significant information about the solution." We believe that there is
much to be gained by a more analytical study of an idealization of the
basic problem (see also [18] or [19]). Therefore, we will consider a
simplified differential game model for the "best" (in the sense discussed
in Section below) use of air power, with our eye on Navy applications.
As we have noted in Appendix A and elsewhere [18], [19], and impor-
tant gap in the previous theory of differential games has been the lack
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of multiplier conditions for differential games with state variable
inequality constraints (SVIC's). It should be noted (see also [19], [21])
that state variable inequality constraints are present in all Lanchester-
type dynamic tactical allocation problems because force levels (which are
represented by state variables ) are required to be non-negative (or some
equivalent condition). Thus, the theoretical state-of-the-art previously
was not adequate to solve all such problems. Hence, this (our study of
the below problem) is an important application of our new theoretical
results given in Appendix A. It should be pointed out that the current
state-of-the-art in optimal control theory (at least its application in
operations research) has not even been sufficient to allow routine solution
of Lanchester-type optimal control problems (see [19]) because of the pres-
ence of SVIC's (see [17], [22]).
In this appendix then we will consider an idealization of a tactical
air-war game. Versions of this problem have been considered by a number
of workers [1], [2], [5], [6], and [7]. A particularly thorough discussion
of modelling aspects of the problem is to be found in [6] . This is the
best reference on modelling aspects that the author has encountered so far
and is the source of many ideas. A special version of the problem that
we will consider has been studied by R. Isaacs (see pp. 96-104 in [7]).
Although he obtains a correct and thorough solution to the problem he
considered, Isaacs does not employ the equivalent of optimality conditions
for differential games with SVIC's. The optimality of constrained subarcs
is not examined, and Isaacs' approach may not yield optimal strategies
for more general problems.
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A. Friedman (see pp. 239-240 of [4]) also considers Isaacs' "War
of Attrition and Attack." His treatment is not nearly as thorough as that
of Isaacs, and Friedman's solution is not complete. He (as does Sternberg
[16]) misses certain subtle aspects first observed by Isaacs (see pp. 102-
104 of [7] and also pp. 948-949 of [9]). Moreover, the emphasis of
Friedman's research [4] is on the existence of value for differential
games with SVIC ' s . The analogues of the well-known control theory multi-
plier conditions for constrained subarcs [8] are not developed. In fact,
the treatment of the example on pp. 239-240 of [4] by Friedman is inade-
quate, since his approach fails to yield optimal strategies for minor
modifications in the problem's formulation (see below). Thus, in this
appendix we present a different and more general analysis than has appeared
in the literature previously.
The problem that we study in this appendix is quite significant
from the standpoint of military operations analysis. Currently, the USAF
is using a similar (although much more detailed) model (TAC CONTENDER) [24],
which has been widely used at the DOD/JCS planning level. Our research
should shed light on cause-effect relationships between modelling assump-
tions and optimal air-war strategies obtained from TAC CONTENDER.
One may consider that there are four essential parts of any dynamical
combat optimization problem:
(1) the decision criteria (for both combatants)
,
(2) the model of conflict termination conditions (and/or unit break-
points)
,
(3) the model of combat dynamics,
(4) the decision latitude of the combatants,
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By decision latitude we mean the extent of choices that decision makers
on both sides can actually control. The other aspects have been discussed
in [19]. Let us mention here that recently Pugh and Mayberry [15] have
discussed the first topic (measures of effectiveness) (see also [14]).
They also propose a computational scheme [14] (Lagrange dynamic programming
[13]). Our analytical work here (and in the future) provides test cases
for the adequacy of their computational approach.
Our analysis approach is more idealized than the TAC CONTENDER model
or the conceptual approach of Pugh and Mayberry [14]. However, we feel
that our research complements these other efforts. We view that our
differential game analysis has several significant uses:
(1) provide guidance for higher-resolution studies,
(2) identify cause-effect relationships between optimal tactics and
modelling assumptions.
2. The Model : A Generalization of the Tactical Air-War Game .
We consider an idealized model in order to gain insights into optimal
air-war tactics. Background material on this model can be found in [6]
(or [1]). The problem that we consider is a generalization of the tactical
air-war game studied by R. Isaacs [7] (i.e. his "War of Attrition and
Attack"). The origin of this problem is apparently due to A. Mengel (see
[6]).
Consider a war between X and Y forces. A land war takes place
and its location will be denoted as the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Rattle
Area) . Both the X and Y forces have a single type of aircraft that
can fly two types of missions: (1) ground support which means flying fire
support missions for the ground forces to influence the outcome of the land
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war and (2) counter-air which results in the shooting down of enemy planes
(but no direct help for the ground forces) . The problem for each commander
is to find the "best" use of his air power (x(t) denotes the number of X
aircraft) . The decision making criterion for each commander is the net
amount of support for the FEBA measured in terms of the "value" of total
missions flown (or, equivalently , weighted tons of ordnance dropped or
weighted total ground support-aircraft days). For planning purposes, the
air war lasts for a prescribed duration of time, denoted as T, and residual
values of surviving aircraft (based on linear utility for both sides 1 sur-
viving aircraft) is considered. It is assumed that new aircraft are
introduced on both sides at constant rates. This situation is shown dia-
grammatically in Figure 1.
x(t) y(t)
Figure 1. Diagram of Generalization of Tactical Air-War Game
I am indebted to MAJ Ron Kronz, USAF for pointing out that this is commonly
done in similar USAF analyses (i.e. TAC CONTENDER).
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Mathematically the problem may be stated as
t_
maximize minimize {v x(t_)-v y(t^) + [B (t) ux-A(t) vy]dt}
,
U V
X i Y i j
with stopping rule: t
f
- T = 0,
dx
subject to: d7
= r ~ (l~v)a(t)y, (1)
(air-battle dynamics)
|| = s - (l-u)b(t)x,
with initial conditions x(t=0) = x and y(t=0) = y ,
and
x,y ^ (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
^ u,v ^ 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints),
where
x(t) and y(t) are the numbers of X and Y aircraft, respectively,
at t ime t
,
a(t) and b(t) are variable (Lanchester) attrition-rate coefficients,
r and s are replacement rates,
v (v ) is the value of one surviving X(Y) aircraft,
X Y
A(t) (B(t)) is the value of one Y (X) aircraft flying ground
support for a unit of time at time t,
u(v) is the fraction of total X(Y) aircraft which fly ground
support missions.
A discussion of the circumstances under which the above air-war equations
have been hypothesized to apply can be found in [20]. It should be noted
that capital letters are used to denote (closed-loop) strategies, i.e.
U = U(t,x,y) and V = V(t,x,y), whereas lower case letters are used to
denote the strategic variables which are their outcomes (or realizations
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of the strategies), i.e. u = u(t) = U(t,x,y). Optimal (and also extremal )
strategies will be denoted as follows: U and V .
3. Development of Basic Necessary Conditions of Optimality .
It should be clear that we have in (1) above that vv ,v ^ 0, that
r,s > 0, and that a(t) ,b (t) ,A(t) ,B (t) > for t £ [0,T]. Friedman has
shown that the differential game (1) has value (see pp. 231-232 of [4]),
and it may be shown that a saddle point exists in pure strategies (see pp.
234-235 of [4]). We now will develop necessary conditions of optimality
for (1).
Applying the results of Appendix A, we have that the Hamiltonian is
given by
H(t,x,y,p,q,u,n,u,v) = B(t)xu - A(t)yv +




for x > 0,
^ for x = 0,
!=
for y > 0,
;& for y = 0.
We have adopted above the following correspondence between state and adjoint
variables
:




We use the term extremal to denote a trajectory on which the necessary condi-
tions of optimality (see Appendix A) are satisfied at every point in time.


















The adjoint system of differential equations for the dual variables is
|£ = _ M = _ B (t)u* + (l-u*)b(t)q + u, (4)
at ox
j* = _ |S = A(t)v* + (l-v*)a(t-)p - n. (5)
The boundary conditions at t = t f for the adjoint variables are





- v where v 1 (6)
'














* ;> for y(t ) = 0.
We also have the transversality condition
H( tf)+ |£-=0,
which yields that a = H(t ) . This latter condition, however, is not useful
for determining optimal strategies.
When x,y > 0, the extremal strategic-variable pair, denoted as
(u* ,v*) , is determined by the max-min principle . Hence, we consider




which by (2) yields




minimize y(-v){A(t) - a(t)p}. (10)
Thus for x,y > 0, we have
1 for (-q(t)) < |^-,
u*(t) = < (11)
* for (-q(t)) > f^j,
and
v*(t) = { (12)
for p(t) >
a(t) .
We must further investigate the possibility of singular subarcs (see
SH
Chapter 8 of [3]) on which, for example, — = for a finite interval
ou
of time (so that all its time derivatives vanish) . For a u-singular
3H
subarc, the condition that -r— = with x,y > yields that on a u-
du
singular subarc we must have
q(t)=-fM (13)
The condition — f-r— ) = along with (12) then yields
dt <*u
A(t)v* + (l-v*)a(t)p(t) =
-^{f{7yl» (^)
or, equivalently , by (12)
maximum {A(t) ,a(t)p(t) } = - —{
-^y} . (15)
Considering the adjoint equations, it is unlikely that (15) would hold for
a finite interval of time. Moreover, when a(t) , b(t) , A(t) , and B(t)
are all constants (e.g. a(t) = a = constant), it is immediately seen that
(15) cannot hold, since
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maximum {A,ap(t)} £ A > = -
-r-{—}'
b
Thus, it is impossible (in general) to have a u-singular subarc of an
optimal trajectory for (1). In a similar fashion, it is readily shown
that it is impossible (in general) to have a v-singular subarc.
3.1. Necessary Conditions of Optimality on Constrained Subarc for x .
X X
On a constrained subarc on which x(t) = for t £ t £ t„ the
e it
dx X X








- imm for ce K c * il- < i6 >




left-hand limit) , such a constrained subarc can occur only when
r £ a(t)y(t) for t < t <; t
£ , (17)
XX XX
with r < a(t )y(t ). Since x(t) = for t £ t £ t„ , the dimension
e e e £
of the state space may be thought of as being reduced by one, and hence
the dimension of the adjoint variable space is reduced by one through
— = 0. This yields
3v
/ x A(t) X X /10 ,P(t) = I(I) f° r V* * * V (18)
The multiplier u(t) is determined by
-r-[ir-) = and hencev J dt^3v J
u(t) = B(t)u* + (l-u*)b(t)(-q(t)) + ^7(^777} for t
X
< t < t* (19)dt L a (t) e a
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Thus, the necessary condition of optimality u(t) ^ leads to that on
a constrained subarc with x(t) = for a finite interval of time we must
have
B(t)u* + (l-u*)b(t)(-q(t)) £ --IjMtl} for tX < t < t* (20)dt l a (t) ' e £
X X
When y > and x(t) = for t £ t £. t„ , we have that v*(t) is
e I
dxdetermined by the condition that -^— = 0. It should be noted that (18)
at
implies that (10) is identically satisfied. In this case only u* is to
be determined by the max-min principle (8). However, when x(t) = 0, then
the max-min principle (or, equivalently
, (9)) no longer yields that we must
have u*(t) given by (11). However, we may still take (11) to hold by a
continuity argument in which we consider x(t) =
€
> and then let
€
+ 0.
Thus, (11) may be used to write (20) as
maximum {B (t) ,b (t) (-q(t) ) } ^ -
-^77^ for tX < t < t* (21)dt a(t; e Jc
Remark : The significance of (20) is that the optimality of Y pursuing a
strategy which results in x(t) = for a finite interval of time
depends upon what X's optimal strategy for using the aircraft
would be if he had them. This type of behavior in which the
optimality of one player steering the system along a state-constrained
subarc depends upon the other player's optimal strategy is unique
to differential games. Furthermore, it apparently has not been
noted in the literature previously.
It remains to discuss the corner conditions which must hold at entrances
to and exits from constrained subarcs on which x(t) = for a finite interval
X X
of time. At entrance to constrained subarc with x(t) = for t £ t £ t'
e Jt
(see Figure 2 below) , we must have
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x=0
Figure 2. Entry to and Exit from Constrained Subarc
















where H(t*~) denotes H(t* x(A=0 ,y (A ,p(t*~) ,q(t*~) ,u=0 ,n=0 ,u* (t*~) ,
X—
v*(t )=1) . It is readily seen that
H(t*~) = p(t*){r - a(t*)y(t*)} + q(t*)s,
and that
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so that H( tX~) = H(tX+ ) ~ p(tX){r - a(tX)y(tX)} = f- {r - a( t
X)y(tX)},














since we must have -r~(t ) < 0. We thus see that the corner conditions
at e
(22) are automatically satisfied when (16) through (20) hold, and thus they
yield no new information.
X X






) = P(t£ }
= p(V'





It is readily seen that
and that








H(tX+ ) = -A(t
X)y(tX ) + (t
X)r + q(tX)s,





Again, we see that the corner conditions (24) are automatically satisfied
when (16) through (20) hold, and thus they yield no new information.
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3.2. Necessary Conditions of Optimality on Constrained Subarc for y .
Similar analysis yields for a constrained subarc on which y(t) =
Y Y









Y Y Y Y
with s £ b(t)y(t) for t < t £ t and s < b(t )y(t ). Additionally,
we must have
(-q(t)) - 1^" for t
Y
&
£ t"* t\ t (27)
and
n(t) = A(t)v* + (l-v*)a(t)p(t) +
^If^yl ^0 for t* < t < t*. (28)
The latter condition may also be written as
A(t)v* + (l-v*)a(t)p(t) :> -
^{f^} for t* < t < t*, (29)
or by use of (12) (which was developed from (10) for y > 0)
maximum {A(t) ,a(t)p (t) } £ - —-{~^} for tY < t < t] . (30)
at b {t) e J6
The corner conditions yield that at entry to constrained subarc on
Y Y
which y(t) = for t £ t £ t. , we must have












Also, the corner conditions yield that at exit from constrained subarc on
Y Y






















I }(-q(tp) f- .b(t*)
3.3. Discussion of Optimality Conditions for Constrained Subarcs .
In this section we will discuss some implications of the above
necessary conditions of optimality that must hold on constrained subarcs.
Let us first consider the case in which the following hold:
a(t) = a = constant,
b(t) = b = constant,
A(t) = A = constant,
B(t) - B = constant.
In this case, the necessary condition of optimality (21) which must hold
X X
on constrained subarcs on which x(t) = for t £ t £ t with t < t
e x. e jo
is automatically satisfied, since we have
maximum {B,b(-q(t))} £ B > = - J^{z\ •
a
Similarly, (29) (or equivalently (30)) is automatically satisfied on con-
Y Y Y Y







we see that necessary conditions of optimality are always satisfied for
the holding of enemy aircraft at a zero level for a finite interval of time
in the case of constant coefficients (i.e. the functions a(t), b(t), A(t),
At least the ones that we have considered above. There are also, of course,
conditions related to the transversality conditions (6) and (7) . These are
examined in Section 4 below.
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and B(t) are all constant) in (1). This is precisely the case of (1)
previously studied by others [4], [7], [16]. In the case of constant
coefficients, there is no question about the optimality of a policy which
results in the annihilation of all enemy aircraft during the appropriate
phase of the air war (see Section 5 below). However, in the case of time-
dependent returns from ground support and time-dependent Lanchester attri-
tion-rate coefficients, the optimality of such a policy is not always
guaranteed. Furthermore, the optimality of a strategy which results in
the annihilation of enemy aircraft depends upon the enemy's strategy for
using his aircraft if he did have them (see, for example, (20) above).
More precisely, for example, the multiplier condition u(t) ^ (upon
which Y bases his strategy) which must hold on a constrained subarc on
which x(t) = depends upon X's optimal strategy (i.e. the enemy's
strategy) . This behavior is unique to differential games and has apparently
never been noticed before.
Let us now give two simple examples which show the complexity in
the general case of determining whether X should try to shoot down all
enemy planes (during the appropriate phase of the air war). Thus, we
consider the necessary condition of optimality (29) which must hold on a
Y Y Y Y
constrained subarc on which y(t) = for t £ t £ t„ with t < t„ .J
e I e I
In the first case, let us assume that the following hold:
a(t) = a = constant,
b(t) = b = constant.
Then, (30) takes the form
maximum (A(t),ap(t)) ^ --j- .
b
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Let us assume that we have A(t) ^ ap(t) . Then we have for the appropriate
phase of the air war
(a) if -7—^0, X should try to shoot down all the Y planes,
dR
(b) if -r— < 0, X may want to fly all ground support missions now
and shoot down enemy planes later in this case in which X's rate
of return from ground support is decreasing.
In the second case, let us assume that the following hold:
A(t) = A = constant,
B(t) = B = constant.
Then, (30) takes the form that we must have
maximum (A,a(t)p(t)) :> r^r t \\2 j^ »
in order for it to be optimal to have y(t) = for a finite interval of
time. Then we have for the appropriate phase of the air war
(a) if — £ 0, X should try to shoot down all the Y planes,
(b) if — > 0, X may want to forget about shooting down Y aircraft
dt
today because tomorrow he will be so much more effective doing this.




It is convenient to consider the switching functions S (t) and
S (t) defined by
S
u




(t) = p(t)a(t) - A(t). (34)
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Then, we may re-write the extremal control laws (11) and (12) for the
strategic variables as
for y > 0:
u*(t)
1 for S (t) < 0,
u
for S (t) > 0, (35)
and
for x > 0:
v*(t) =
1 for S (t) < 0,
for S (t) > 0. (36)
Since we will develop the solution to (1) by working backwards from
the end at t f = T, it is convenient to introduce the backwards time x
defined by
t = T - t. (37)
It should be noted that -r~ =
,





(x) = (-q(x))b(x) - B(x), (38)
S
y
(x) = p(x)a(x) - A(x), (39)
where A(x) = A(T-x) , etc. and p(x) = p(T-x) and we again denote
p(x) as p(x), etc. Then from (35)
for y > 0:
u*(x) =
1 for S (x) < 0,
u
for S (x) > 0, (40)
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and it follows from (38) and the adjoint equations that
d(t){A(t)v* + (l-v*)a(x) P (x)} + (-q(i)^- " ^ for y > 0,




for y = (for a finite interval of time) . (41)
Similarly,
for x > 0:




( for S (t) > 0, (42)
and it follows from (39) and the adjoint equations that




for x = (for a finite interval of time)
.
4. Extremal End States
.
.
By an extremal end state we mean a terminal point in the state space
for which necessary (transversality) conditions of optimality are satisfied,
Let us first consider in detail the situation for the X aircraft. There
are two possibilities which we denote as follows:
(a) E^ : x(T) > 0,




there are two further subcases as follows:
(1) x(T) = with x(t) =0 for tX <: t <: T where tX < T,
(2) x(T) = with x(t) >0 for T - 6 <; t < T where 6 > 0.
Let us first consider the end state E : x(T) > . By (6) at
t, = T, we have p(t=t ) = v , since x(t =T) > 0. Thus,
t t X t
for x(t
f





Also, by (36) (or equivalently (12))
A(T)
(
X f ° r V
X * a(T)>
v*(t=t ) = {
( for v„ *
A(T)
-
X * a(T). (45)
Comment: If v = 0, then v*(t=t ) = 1. This is the only case considered
X x
in previous analyses [4], [7], [16^
Let us now consider necessary conditions of optimality for the end
state E : x(T) = . As above, there are two subcases to be considered.
In case (1): x(T) = with x(t) =0 for t^ <; t £ T where tX < T
(i.e. at the end the system has been on a constrained subarc for a finite
interval of time) , we have by (18) that
P(T) - ±jg, _ (46)
since the system has been on a constrained subarc for a finite interval
of time. Also, by the transversality condition (6), we have that
p(T) = v - v where v ^ 0.
X _L J_
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for it to be optimal to have x(T) = when the system has been on a
constrained subarc for a finite interval of time. In case (2) : x(T) =
with x(t) > for all t
€
[T-6 ,T) where 6 >
, it is clear that we
must have v*(t) =0 for t
€
(T-6 T) c (T-6 ,T) where < 6 «£ 6
,
since this is the only way that we can reach x(T) = with x(t) >
for all t £ [T-6,T). By (10) (see also (12)) in order to have v*(t) =
A(t)for all t G (T-6 ,T) we must necessarily have p(t) ^ —r-r-- By the
l a (, t )




We also have the transversality condition (47) so that p(T) = v - v k
A I
A(T)/a(T) which we may also write as v ^ A(T)/a(T) + v > A(T)/a(T),
X 1
since v ^ 0. Thus, we see that (48) is again a necessary condition for
it to be optimal to have x(T) - but x(t) > for all t fc [T-6 ,T)
where 6 > 0.
Considering the above, we see that we have proved the following
theorem.
THEOREM 1: If an optimal strategy for Y is to result




It should be recalled that we have shown it to be impossible to have a
singular solution for x,y > 0. Hence, v*(t) must be equal to or 1
almost everywhere in time.
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In other words, in order that the end state E : x(T) = be an extremal
end state we must have v ^ A(T)/a(T). We also have the following as an
A.
immediate corollary.
ACT)COROLLARY 1.1: If v < . '
,
then an optimal strategy
for Y leads to x*(T) > 0.
Remark: In the problem considered by Isaacs [7] and others [4], [16]
previously, we have v = 0, A(t) = 1, and a(t) = a = constant
A.
so that an optimal strategy for Y resulted in x*(T) > 0. The
optimality of this condition apparently was never examined pre-
viously. In fact, an implicit assumption in Friedman's example
on pp. 239-240 of [4] is that an optimal policy results in
x*(T) > 0. From Theorem 1 we see that this need not be true in
general
.
In a similar fashion, we can prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 2: If an optimal strategy for X is to result in








, ,_, , then an optimal strategy
i b (.1;
for X leads to y*(T) > 0.
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Remark: It seems appropriate to point out the following interpretations:
(a) a(T)v rate at which one Y aircarft can destroy value
of X aircraft at end of campaign,
(b) A(T) = rate of return from one Y aircraft from flying
ground support missions at end.
Considering the above, the meaning of Theorem 1 is clear: in
order for Y to follow a strategy which results in x(T) = 0,
it must be to his advantage to do so.
5. Solution for Special Case of Constant Coefficients .
In this section we will develop the solution to (1) for the special
case in which all the coefficients are constants. In other words, we will
consider the case in which the following hold:
a(t) = a = constant,
b(t) = b = constant,
A(t) = A = constant,
B(t) = B = constant.
For notational convenience we will again denote a as a, etc. It is




(Bux-Avy)dt},maximize minimize {v x(t f )-v y(t ) +
U V
X t Y t
with stopping rule: t
f
- T = 0,
subject to: — = r - (l-v)ay, (50)
(air-battle dynamics)
& = s - (l-u)bx,
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with initial conditions x(t=0) = x_ and y(t=0) = y ,
and
x,y k (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
£ u,v £ 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints)
,
where a is a given constant and similarly for b, A, and B.
Let us now review the necessary conditions of optimality that we
have developed for (50) in Section 3. Let us recall the switching functions
in backwards time t = T - t. These are
S
u




(x) = ap(x) - A. (52)
We had developed earlier (see (40) through (43)) the following character-
ization of optimal strategies:
for y >
1 for S (t) < 0,
u
u*(t) =
for S (x) > 0, (53)
and
for x > 0:
v*(x) =
1 for S (x) < 0,
for S (x) > 0, (54)
with
dg











a{Bu* + (l-u*)b(-q(r))} > for x > 0,
(56)
dS
for x = (for a finite interval of time)
Thus we see that -— > with strict inequality for y > and similarly
for s
v
(t). From (15) we see that singular subarcs are impossible.
On a constrained subarc on which x(t) =0 for t < t < t„ we
e x.
have shown the following to be necessary conditions for optimality:
v*(t) = 1 ~- for tX < t < t*





, X Xfor t < t < t
n ,
e I





The requirement (21) is automatically satisfied, since
maximum {B,b(-q(t))} > B > = drAi _ X 2- tH-} for t < t < t.dt l a J e J
Similar consitions hold on a constrained subarc on which y(t) = for a
finite interval of time.
Concerning extremal end states, we have developed the following.
PROPOSITION 1: If an optimal strategy for Y is to result






PROPOSITION 2: If v„ < — , then an optimal strategy for Y
X a
leads to x*(T) > 0.
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PROPOSITION 3: If an optimal strategy for X is to result






PROPOSITION 4: If vv < — , then an optimal strategy X
i b
leads to y*(T) > 0.
We also have the following boundary conditions for the adjoint variables:
p(t=T) = v - v where v
= for x(T) > 0,




+ v where v
= for y(T) > 0,
> for y(T) = 0.
(61)




/ b{A + (1-v*)S
v
(t)} for y > 0,
— - IdT I
(62)
for y = (for a finite interval of time),
dS
/ a{B + (1-u*)S
u





for x = (for a finite interval of time),
with initial conditions
S (t=0) = (bv -B) - bv. and S (t=0) = (av -A) - av
U. I Z V A .1
(64)
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5.1. Synthesis of Extremal S tratcgic-Variable Pair .







, I (2) vY * I
These cases will be denoted as (II), (12), (III), and (112). The solution
to (50) must be developed for each case separately. It should be noted
that Case (12) and Case (III) are symmetric: Case (12) is the same as
Case (III) only with the roles of X and Y interchanged. These then
are three cases of different structures for the optimal strategies.
In each case, the solution to (50) is developed by working backwards
from the end of the war at t = t, = T (or, equivalently , T = 0) where
the boundary information (60) through (63) is known. The differential
equations for the switching functions S (t) and S (x) may then be
integrated backwards (using (53) and (54) (or (57) on constrained subarcs))
so that the initial conditions are just met. This procedure leads to syn-
thesis of an extremal strategic-variable pair and a corresponding extremal
*
trajectory. In the case in which the extremal trajectory is unique (in
the sense that there is a single extremal path through any point of the
state space which leads to the terminal manifold, it is the optimal trajec-
tory. This is the situation in all cases except for one exceptional set
of circumstances for Case (12). The optimal strategies in this (exceptional)
situation have not been resolved at the time of the writing of this report.
This is an important future research task, since the development of
By an extremal trajectory we mean a path along which the necessary conditions
of optimality (see Appendix A) are satisfied everywhere in time.
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computational schemes for time-sequential combat games (such as application
of Lagrange dynamic programming as proposed in [13], [14]) depends upon
its successful completion.
Case (II): v„ < — and v„ < --.
__—
i
1 — V o - - V———
K
Let us make the nonrestrictive assumption that
A-av B-bv
—ir * ~w • (65)
By Propositions 2 and 4 we have that x*(T) > and y*(T) > so that
by (64) we have
S (t=0) = bv - B < and S (t=0) = av - A < 0. (66)
U I V A
One obtains from (66) via (53) and (54) that
u*(t=0) = 1 and v*(x=0) = 1. (67)
By straightforward continuity arguments, it is readily seen that
u*(t) - 1
^ v*(t) = 1
for t e [0,t ], (68)
where t
1
denotes the "backwards time" of the first switch in (extremal)
tactics. Using (62), (63), and (68), we see that the differential equations
for the switching functions are for < t < t
dS
-— = bA with S (t=0) = bvv - B < 0, (69)dx u i
and
dS
-r~^- = aB with S (x=0) = av„ - A < 0, (70)dT V A
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so that for < x < T




S (x) = aBx + av - A.
v X (72)
The "backwards" switching time t











The assumption (65) then yields that t, = t < t so that v*(t) switches
1 v u
first in backwards time at
A-av
t, = t =
X
1 v aB (75)
We then have for x(t) >
u*(t) = 1
v*(t) =
for t e (t ,t ), (76)
where t 9 denotes the "backwards time" of the second switch in (extremal)
tactics. It should be noted that by (50) and (76) we have y(x) > for
< t < t„. Using (62), (63), (71), (72), (75), and (76), we see that the
differential equations for the switching functions are for x < t < t
dS
dx
- = b{A+S (t)} with S (t=T.) = bAJ











aB for x >
for x = (for finite
interval of time)
with VT=V = (78)
There are two cases to be considered
(a) x(t=T-T;L ) > 0,
(b) x(t=T-T] ) = 0.
In Case (a): x(t=T-x ) > , we have that x(t) > for ' ' x ^ T
by (50) and (76). Hence, (54) and (78) yield that v*(t) = for all
x > T, . Integrating (77) and (78), we obtain
s (T)=fk(BT+ )2











The switching time t = x„ is determined by S (t=t ) = and hence
u 2 u u
/ fB_bvv^ (A~aVY^
T 9




Again, (53) and (55) yield that once u*(t) = there are no further
switches in the strategic variables as we progress backwards in time.
In Case (b): x(t=T-x ) = 0, we have that x(t) = for x » x
X X * *
< t < t and x(t) > for t < x < x_, where x~ denotes the
e e 2 2
"backwards time" of the second switch in (extremal) tactics in the case
X i> Xin which x(t) = for x < x < t s x . When x(x) = for x = x
_L e z. A* x
X ^









X X 'i/When x( T ) > for x < x < x 9 , (77) and (78) become for t ^ x ^ x„
dS






( T)} with S
u







-~ = aB with S (x=t ) -dx v e (85)
X 'V/Integration of (84) and (85) yields that for x < x £ x„
e 2
S (x) = ^r (x-x
X
)
2 + bA( T-xX ) + bA{ TX -




S (x) = aB(x-x )
v e
(87)
The switching time x - T* is determined by S (x=x ) = and hence
u 2 u u









bA Thus, we have x„
= tJt ). It is
2 2 e










































r-r— I. Hence, x has a
It seems appropriate
i f~ rB~bvv1 rA-av i
l aB J














Thus, we see that












bA This means that the switching time for
u*(t) depends upon force levels, since it depends upon whether or not x(t)
rA-av,
is driven to zero before t=T- t =T- X
aB
when T > x . Further-
XX X
more, when x(t) = for T-x =t < t < t = T - x, , the switching
e e *< 1
time for X, i.e. x_ = x , depends upon the time (or, equivalently , the
backwards time x ) at which the X forces are annihilated. Again, (53)
and (55) yield that once u*(t) = there are no further switches in the
strategic variables as we progress further backwards in time. This situation
is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3 below. Thus, we see that X switches
to concentration on ground support earlier in those compaigns in which
x
, y , and T are such that X will lose all his planes before
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No t e : Strategic Variab les
X: u
Y: v
Figure 3. Dependence of X Switching Time t„ ~ t










~r— ] > 0- This means that X s optimal
strategy is to use his planes for ground support earlier in such cases than
when x(t=T-x
1
) > because they are annihilated before the last phase of
the air war (when both sides concentrate on ground support). Thus , X uses
his planes for ground support while they are still available. This phenom-
enon was first noted (for a simpler case of (50)) by Professor Rufus Isaacs
[7 J (see also pp. 948-949 of [9]).''
Case (12): vv <
A
- and v >J^.a a— Y b
By Proposition 2 we have that x*(T) > so that by (64) we have
S (t=0) = av - A < 0,
V A
(93)
and by (54) we obtain
v*(t=0) = 1, (94)
By Proposition 3 an optimal strategy for X can lead to y*(T) = so
that by (64) we have
S (t=0) = (bv -B) - bv where v
= for y(T) > 0,
> for y(T) = 0.
(95)
There are two cases to be considered:
(a) y(t=T) > 0,
(b) y(t=T) = 0.
In Case (a) : y(t=T) > , we have that
ft*
The reader should recall the nonrestrictive assumption (65)
.
This behavior is not noted in either [4] (see pp. 239-240) or [16]
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S (t=0) = bv
y
- B > 0. (96)
By continuity of y(t), we have that y(t) > for t e (T-6,T] where
6 > so that (55) and (96) yield that S (t) > for < x < T. Hence,
u
(53) yields that u*(x) = for < t < T, and a backwards integration
of the state equation for y(x) yields y(x) > for ^ x < T. Also,
it is readily seen by a straightforward continuity argument on S (t) that
u*( T ) =
v*(t) = 1
for t e [0,x
1 ],
(97)
where x denotes the "backwards time" of the first switch in (extremal)
tactics. It is readily seen that x(x) > for x e [0,x ). The dif-
ferential equation for the switching functions are then for ^ x < x
dS
— = bA with S (x=0) = bvv - B > 0, (98)dx u Y
dS
— = a{B + S (x)} with S (x=0) = avv - A < 0, (99)dx u v X
so that for < x < x





(T) - f (Ax+vY )^ - || v^ + avx - A. (101)
The switching time t = t. is determined by S (x=x ) = and hence
V 1 V V
*! • \ ' JIM + % <A-avx)-vY }. d02)








In Subcase (1): x( t=T-T -. ) > , continuity arguments on x(t) lead to




for t e (T ,T], (103)
and x(t) > for t T. In Sub case (2): x(t=T-x..) = 0, we haveXX X
that x(t) = for x„ = x < x < x < T and x(t) > for x < x < T,
£ 1 e e
v
Using (62) and (63) , we readily obtain for x, < x ^ x
S (t) « bAx + bv
y
- B > 0, (104)
and
S (x) - 0. (105)
Thus we have
u*(t) =
v*(x) = 1 - —
ay




Since x(x) > for x e (x ,x +6), arguments similar to the above yield
e e
V












(1) y(t) =0 for t £ t < T with tY < T,
e e
(2) y(t=T) = but y(t) >0 for T-6<t<T where 6 > 0.
Y Y
In Subcase (1): y(t) = for t < t < T with t < T , it is readily
seen that we must have
U*(T) - 1 - ^
for t e: [0,tY ], (108)
e
v*(t) = 1
so that a result analogous to (59)
,
(62) , and (63) yield that for
Y ^





(t) = 0, (109)
and
S (t) - aBx + av v - A. (110)
v X
Y
It is readily seen that we must have y(x) > for t < t < T. Thus







where x, denotes the "backwards time" of the first switch in (extremal)
Y
tactics in the case in which y(t) = for < T < T , and
u*(t) =
v*(t) =
for t € (Tlf T], (U2)
r^ Y





Then (62) and (63)
Y ^become for t < t < t,
e 1
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so that for x < x < x„
e 1




S (t) = ^r (t-t
Y
)
2 + aB(T-TY ) + aBT
Y
+ av - A.
v 2 e e e X
(116)
%
The switching time T = T- is determined by S (t=t ) = and hence
v 1 v v
x = T = x
Y




for < x < x' =
e 1
A-av
X ^ ^ , Y N
—
— . Thus, we have t 1 = t 1 (t ) . It is readily seeraB lie A
rA-av„i% Y Y










































Hence, x has a






























It should be noted that
*\*0 *v» *>*












As we discussed for Case (II) : vY < - andA 3.
v < —
,
this means that the switching time for v*(t) depends upon force
i b
levels, since it depends upon whether or not y(t) is driven to zero before
t = T. Other aspects so far are similar to this previous case.
In Subcase (2): y(t=T) = but y(t) >Q for T - 6 < t < T
where 6 > , it is clear that we must have u*(t) = for all
t e (0,6..) c (0,6). Thus, we have
u*(t) =
v*(t) = 1
for t e [0,t ], (122)
where x denotes the "backwards time" of the first switch in (extremal)
tactics in the case in which y(x=0) = but y(x) > for < x < 6.

















Using (122) in the integration of the differential equations (62) and (63)
for the switching functions with the boundary conditions (93) and (123),
we obtain for < t < x..
S (t) = bAx + bvy
- B, (125)
and
(126)ab ab8 (t) = f^Ax+ (vY-v 2 )}2
- f (vy-v 2 )2 + avYX
It should be noted that x(x), y(x) > for x > 0,
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The switching time x = T, is determined hy S (t=t ) = and hence
v 1 v v
T
X





2 + f(A-avx ) - (vY-« 2 )}, (127)




It is readily seen that
u*(t) -
1 v*"(t) =
for x e (t ,T] (128)
Thus, we have x = x (v ) where v is chosen so that y(t=T) = but
y(t) > for T - 6 < t < T. It is readily seen that T is a strictly
(bv
y-Biincreasing function of v for < v <












It seems appropriate to note that













Thus, t is a strictly increasing function of v_, and we have
^ o
T < T < T
1 1 " 1





It should also be noted that x > x for bv > B. Thus, from (132) we
see that for bv > B more than one extremal can lead to a point P =
( x f »y f )
= (* f ,0) with x f > on the terminal manifold. Thus, in Figure
4 the extremal trajectories labelled as (1), (2), and (3) all lead to the
terminal manifold with y f = . Let P = (x-.,yn ) denote a point in the
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initial state space from which an extremal leads to P = (x ,0) with
)v*(t) =1 f° r ° - t - T and t 1 < T < t °. Furthermore, let C° denote
the set of all such points, i.e. C = {P |system reaches P = (x ,0) from
lv*(t) = 1 f° r ° ~ t ~ T and T 1 - T - t
°}. From the backwards synthesis
procedure for the extremal strategic-variable pair, it is readily seen that
the set C lies on the "backwards extension" of the extremal which originates
(in backwards time) from (x.,,0) with x c > . The curve C is shown in
r r
/
* o iu*(t) =Figure 4 . From any point on C an extremal with J .,., ; , for ^ t ^ T
' v*(t) = 1
leads to P = (x ,0) by the appropriate choice of v . For different values
of P
,
there are different values of v . One such P for which v is
dS
— % o v
such that T.. < x, < x is shown in Figure 4. Since -— > 0, we must111 dT
have v*(t) = for t > t so that working backwards yields that the
extremal labelled (2) passes through P . Thus, the figure suggests (also
look at extremals emanating from P ) that there are several ways to reach
the terminal manifold from a subset of the state space. The optimality of
extremal trajectories has not been determined for this special case of
multiple extremals. We will report our results to date with the final deter-
mination for the complete solution to (50) in Case (12) : v < — and
a a
v__ > — being deferred to the future. In other words, the solution has not
I b
been completely determined in the shaded region of Figure 4.
In considering Figure 4, let us consider the case in which we have
, u*(t) -
< for < t < T. (133)
[ v*(t) = v(t)
The reader is cautioned that Figure 4 represents a two-dimensional (i.e. t
and y) illustration of the projection of extremals onto a plane parallel to
the plane x = in the three dimensional state space (i.e. t, x, and y
space). For notational convenience, we are not being precise about which
entities are in the (t,x,y)-space and which are projections onto the above
noted subspace. Thus, C° denotes both a figure in (t , x,y)-space and also
its projection on (t,y)-space. Similar remarks apply to Figure 5.
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Optimal Y Strategy







No t e : St rategic Variables
X: u
Y: v
Figure 4. Dependence of Y Switching Time T- = T




Then (133) may be combined with the state equations (50) and integrated to
yield
and
x(t) = x + rt - a







The above may be combined to yield the following (Volterra integral equation)
for y(t):
y(t) = Yn + (s-bxjt - ^ft 2 + ab0' ds. U-v(s 2 )}y(s 2 )ds 2 (136)




°(t) = yQ + (s-bxQ )t








and when v(s) = 1 for < s < t, we obtain
y
V=1
(t) = yO + (s-bxQ )t
- ^t 2 .
It is also readily shown by direct integration of (50) with (133) when
v(s) = for < s < t that
- s-k x
n
y (t) = -(ay^-r)cosh^b t + ( )sinh/ab t + -.
a °
v^b"





(t) for t > 0, (140)
(139)
provided that y(t) > and that strict inequality holds for a finite
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interval of time. Hence, whenever an (initial ) point lies on C (such
as (B) = P in Figure 5), if Y uses the extremal strategy v*(t) =
for = T - x, < t < T - x, when bv > B, the resulting extremal tra-
jectory lies (strictly) above that corresponding to v* (t) = 1 for
< t < T. This situation is shown in Figure 5 (which is expanded detail
of Figure 4) below. Thus, at point (B) = P (which lies on C ) in
Figure 5 Y can use an extremal strategy which leads either in the direc-
tion denoted as (3) or (4) (and results in extremals denoted as (b) and (c))
Moreover, if the trajectory began with t = at, for example, point (A),
then the extremal strategy v*(t) = for < t < T - x must have been
dS




if extremal (b) is chosen, S (1=1,) = and > 0. Hence, C itself
v 1 dx
may be a transition surface (depending upon the choice of Y when C is
first encountered). Furthermore, at (A) Y can choose either of two
extremal directions denoted as (1) and (2) (and resulting in an extremal
denoted as (a) or the one which leads to (B)). Thus, the problem apparently
has multiple extremals (in the "triangular" region denoted as P PQ) . It
appears as though there may exist extremal trajectories (such as the one
discussed above) at various points along which Y has a choice of alterna-
tive extremal strategies (i.e. a bifurcation occurs) that result in extremal
trajectories denoted as (a), (b) , and (c).
It has not been determined (by direct computation of the criterion
functional) which extremal strategy is optimal for Y in this special set
The diagrams of battle trajectories in this report are sketched for a forward
evolution of the battle (e.g. a curve of y(t) for constant x
n
) • Isaacs [7]
considers a backward evolution (e.g. a curve of y(x) for constant x f = x(t=T))
Neither approach is sufficient to determine optimal strategies. One must either
invoke sufficient conditions for optimality or use the solution methodology






Figure 5. Illustration of Multiple Extremal Strategies
v* for Y when bv > B (not drawn to scale )
.
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of circumstances. However, considering well-known sufficient conditions
of global optimality based on convexity for optimal control problems, the
author conjectures that all extremal strategies are optimal for Y and
lead to the same return. If this is true, it means that there is an
"indifference" set in Y's optimal strategy space such that he can vary
the survivability of his aircraft at will without changing the value of his
D
criterion functional. It should be noted that this occurs for vv > —
,
i b
i.e. the Y aircraft (speaking somewhat imprecisely now) are valued greater
than the return obtained from gound support missions at the end of the war.
Case (III): v > — and v < — .
a a i b
A B
This case is similar to Case (12) (vv < - and vv > —) with theX a id
roles of X and Y being interchanged.
Case (112): vw > - and vv gff-.X a Y——
b
By Proposition 1 an optimal strategy for Y can lead to x*(T) =
so that by (64) we have
S (t=0) = (av -A) - av. where v
u XI L = for x(T) > 0,
> for x(T) = 0.
There are two cases to be considered:
(A) x(t=T) > 0,
(B) x(t=T) = 0.
Similarly, by Proposition 3 an optimal strategy for X can lead to y*(T) =
so that by (64) we again have (95). There are two further cases to be con-
sidered :
(a) y(t=T) > 0,
(b) y(t-T) = 0.
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and (Bb) where (Aa) denotes that we have x(t=T) > and y(t=T) >
is similar to that done in Case (12) (v < - and vv > £) and thereforeX a ib
the details will be omitted. It may be shown that in all cases (i.e. (Aa)
,
(Ab), (Ba), and (Bb)) we must have
S (t=0) > and S (t=0) > 0,
u v
(142)
so that, for example, we have < v <
av -A
x
when x*(t=T) = 0. Con-
l a J
sidering (53), (54), (62), (63), and (142), arguments similar to those
used above readily yield
( for y(x) >
u*(t) =
1 - r~ for y(-r) -bx
for all t e [0,T]. (143)
for x(t) >
v*(t) =
Extremals are unique and therefore optimal.
1 - — for x(t) =
ay
5.2. Optimal Air-War Strategies .
In this section we will summarize the results of the previous section,
In summarizing the optimal air-war strategies for X and Y, we must
consider the four cases (i.e. (II), (12), (III), and (112)) delineated above.
Case (II): av < A and bv < B .
X x





































/ U*(t,x,y) - 1
( V*(t,x,y) - {
for x >
1 - — for x =
ay











< t < T,



























<b > % =Tf + ^{/A+2aAB {e a
B-bv^
bA
- T [} - A for x(t=T-x ) = 0.
X X






~7r = T l " Te " T 2 = —bA~ '



















< t < T.
Case (12): av < A and bv„ > B
.
A Y









1 - — for y = for ^ t 5 T.bx





















for y(t=T) > 0,
(b ) ^^ +^^( fA'aVx - tY} - B} for y(t=T) = 0,
Y Y
where t is largest value of t such that y(t=T-x )
Y % A_aVX
and < t < x' = r^
,el aB
=
(c) t, = xl for y(t=T) = when x > x!
,
A final determination of the optimality of the extremal strategies still
remains to be done in this case. Furthermore, the extremal strategy for





( U*(t,x,y) = {
)
l
1 - £ for




for T - t < t £> T.
Case _( III)
:
av ^ A_ and bv < B.
(1) If T Ij/v 2 + £( B-bv7- vx } - V
U*(t,x,y) 7 1
V*(t ,x,y) = <
r
for x >
1 for x =
ay













(a) T = t- for x(t=T) > 0,
for t T - x ,
(b) \ = T e. + a^/A2+2aAB {
B-bv.
bA









and < T < t' =
*
,el bA
(c) T-. = t' for x(t=T) = when xX > t'
,11 el
A final determination of the optimality of the extremal strategies still






for T < t. < t < T.
r
ay
Case (112): av A and bvw B
,
X Y




v 1 - :— for
bx
for x >
for < t < T,
r
*(t,x,y) = (




Some Results for Case of Linearly-Decreasing-with-Time Returns from
Ground Support .
One criticism of the constant coefficient version (50) of the general-
ization (1) of the tactical air-war game is that the criterion functional
does not adequately reflect timeliness of ground support. Intuitively, we
would expect that support of the ground forces is "worth more" in the early
stages of the ground war than later on. Thus, we are led to consider time-
dependent "returns" from ground support that decrease over time. Two cases
of time-dependent returns from ground support that are of particular
interest are
(1) linearly-decreasing-with-time returns from ground support,
(2) exponentially-decreasing-with-time returns from ground support.
Interest in these cases was confirmed in informal discussions with Maj Ron
Kronz, USAF. Such facets have been apparently explored in numerous runs
of TAC CONTENDER.
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Let us consider the case of (1) in which Lite LanchesLer attrition-rate
coefficients for counter-air operations are constants and the returns from
ground support are time dependent (decreasing over time). Thus, we will
consider the case in which the following hold:
a(t) ~ a = constant,
b(t) - b = constant,
A(t) is given (decreasing) function of time,
B(t) is given (decreasing) function of time.
For notational convenience we will again denote a as a and b as b.
It is then convenient to re-state the problem as follows:
t.
[B(t)ux-A(t)vy]dt>,maximize minimize {v x(t f )-v y(t p ) +
U V
X t Y 1
with stopping rule: t - T = 0,
dx
subject to: — = r - (l-v)ay, (144)
(air-battle dynamics)
fjL.r s - d-u)bx,
with initial conditions x(t=0) = x and y(t=0) = y_
,
and
x,y Z (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
< u,v < 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints),
where a and b are given constants and A(t) and B(t) are given
f unc tions
.
In this section we will consider the case in which both A(t) and
B(t) are linearly decreasing functions of time for < t < T. The situa-

























Figure 6. Linearly-Decreasing-wi th-Time Returns from Ground Support A(t)
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We will now review the necessary conditions of optimality that we
have developed for (144) in Section 3 before partially synthesizing the
extremal strategies in one of four cases. We hope to give a more thorough
study of this important problem in the future. Let us recall the switching
functions in backwards time t = T - t
S
u
(t) = b(-q(x)) - B(t), (147)
S
v
(t) = ap(-r) - A(t),
where
and
A(t) - A(T-t) = A
T
+ x








Again, extremal strategies are given by (53) and (54) for x,y > 0. The
differential equations for the switching functions are given by
dB




b{A(x) + (10v*)S (t)} - 0





a{B(x) + (l-u*)S (x)} - ~ for x > ,
u dx
for x = (for a finite interval of time),
(152)
with initial conditions
S (x=0) = (bvv-B_) - bv, and S (x=0) = (av -A ) - avu YTz v XT1 (153)
where v and \> must satisfy (60) and (61), respectively. It is also








+ t ^Y^l + (1-v*)Sv (t)
-
V^
for y > 0,
(154)









(t)} - VAT for x > 0,
to
(155)
for x = (for a finite interval of time)
It is readily shown that singular solutions are impossible. For example,



















Observing that (l-u*)S (x) > 0, it is clear that , n > for all x
u dx
in the latter case, since it is a convex combination of positive quantities
X X
On a constrained subarc on which x(t) = for t < t < t we
e
have shown the following to be necessary conditions for optimality:





X t xfor t
e
< t < tv
for t < t < t.
e I





B(t)u* + (l-u*)b(-q(t)) > T (159)
Other convenient equivalent forms of (159) are
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or








It is to be noted that (159) is no longer automatically satisfied on con-
strained subarcs. Similar conditions hold on a constrained subarc on which
y(t) = for a finite interval of time.
Concerning extremal end states, we have developed the following.
PROPOSITION 5: If an optimal strategy for Y is to result
in x*(T) = 0, then it is necessary that
> Tv £ — .
X a
PROPOSITION 6: If v < —
,
then an optimal strategy
for Y leads to x*(T) > 0.
PROPOSITION 7: If an optimal strategy for X is to result
in y*(T) = 0, then it is necessary that
•
v S — .
Y b
PROPOSITION 8: If vv < — , then an optimal strategy
i b
for X leads to y*(T) > 0.
In synthesizing an extremal strategic-variable pair there are four
cases to be considered:



















for y > 0,
(154)








(t)} - T for x > 0,
to
(155)
for x = (for a finite interval of time)
It is readily shown that singular solutions are impossible





















Observing that (l-u*)S (t) > 0, it is clear that ? > for all t
u dT
in the latter case, since it is a convex combination of positive quantities
X X
On a constrained subarc on which x(t) = for t < t < t we
e
have shown the following to be necessary conditions for optimality:





for t < t < t £>
X X
for t < t < t.
e x
X X












Other convenient equivalent forms of (159) are
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It is to be noted that (159) is no longer automatically satisfied on con-
strained subarcs. Similar conditions hold on a constrained subarc on which
y(t) = for a finite interval of time.
Concerning extremal end states, we have developed the following.
PROPOSITION 5: If an optimal strategy for Y is to result
in x*(T) = 0, then it is necessary that
v ^ — .
X a
PROPOSITION 7: If an optimal strategy for X is to result
in y*(T) = 0, then it is necessary that
v £ — .
Y b
PROPOSITION 8: If v„ < —
, then an optimal strategy
Y b
for X leads to y*(T) > 0.
In synthesizing an extremal strategic-variable pair there are four




> »s*T <"> vx s T
(i) v













In Case (11) : v„ < -— and v„ < - , we have by Propositions 6
~~X a Y b
—
and 8 that x*(T) > and y*(T) > so that by (J 5 3) we have
S (t=0) = bv - B < and S (t=0) = av„ - A < 0. (162)
U I J. V A 1
By the usual arguments, i t is readily seen that
u*(t) = 1
W*(t) = 1
for t e [0,t ], (163)
and x(x),y(x) > for x e [0 , t ) . Using (162) and (163), the differentia]
equations for the switching functions may be integrated to yield for
< t < X
b fVM
and
V T > 2









VP + <aBT - 'A0"AT }x + avx - A .
(16A)
(165)
Let t denote the (only) positive root of S (t=t ) = and similarly
u u u
for t . Then we have
v






































The backwards switching time t, is then given by




It should be noted that in order for the switch to actually occur we require
that t ii T. Omitting the rather tedious details, it is a straightforward
matter to prove the following theorem:
THEOREM 3: In order that t e [0,T) for B > bv
,
(1) it is necessary that "*?] < k-




o>) f^lT}<T 'A V
A similar theorem is readily proven concerning t . Thus, we see that in
order for a switch in extremal strategies from (163) to occur additional
conditions are required. This should be contrasted with the constant coeffi-
cient case considered in Section 5 in which for the analogous situation (i.e.
Case (II)). A switch in extremal strategies from (68) was guaranteed if
A-av
x
the duration of the battle was long enough (i.e. T > - ). As an immediate
3. .D
















the solution to (144) with A(t) and B(t)
given by (145) and (146) is given by
/U*ft) = 1















Shortness of time precludes further results for this problem. The author
hopes to give further details in the future.
7 . Some Results for Case of Exponentially-Decreasing-with-Time Returns from
Ground Support .
In this section we will briefly consider the case in which both A(t)
and B(t) are exponentially decreasing functions of time for < t < T.
We have then that










where a, 6 > 0.
We will now review the review the necessary conditions of optimality
that we have developed for (144) in Section (3) before partially synthesizing
the extremal strategies in one of four cases. Again, we hope to give a more
thorough study of this important problem in the future. As before, the
extremal strategies are given by (53) and (54) for x,y > 0. The differen-

















for y > 0,
—y
= <dx i
for y = (for a finite interval of time),
and
(172)
,_ , a(l-u*)S (t) + (aBn e
BT )e
6t
- (aA_e aT ) e
aT
for x > 0,db ( u
T^ = <dx |





















) - a\)^, (174)
where v, and v„ must satisfy (60) and (61), respectively.
X XOn a constrained subarc on which x(t) = for t ^ t ? t , we
e
have shown that (156) through (158) are necessary conditions for optimality
and also
A
B(t)u* + (l-u*)b(-q(t)) > — - e at . (175)
a.
Other convenient equivalent forms of (175) are
or




maximum (b (t) ,b (-q (t) ) } > e
(176)
(177)
As in the previous case, it is to be noted that (175) is no longer auto-
matically satisfied on constrained subarcs. Similar conditions hold on a
constrained subarc on which y(t) = for a finite interval of time.
Concerning extremal end states, we have developed the following.
PROPOSITION 9: If an optimal strategy for Y is to result in








PROPOSITION 10: If v < —
,
then an optimal strategy for
X 3.
strategy for Y leads to x*(T) > 0.
PROPOSITION 11: If an optimal strategy for X is to result in













Y ™b~ ' ' then an optimal strategy
for X leads to y*(T) > 0.
In synthesizing an extremal strategic-variable pair there are four
























We will now give some initial results in the first of the above cases
In Case (II): v <
X
V-aT v"ST
and b w < , we have by Proposi-Y b —
tions 10 and 12 that x*(T) > and y*(T) > so that by (174) we have
-BT -aT












By the usual arguments, it is readily seen that
,u*(t) - 1
<v*(t) = 1
for t e [0,1^^], (179)
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and x(x),y(x) > for t e [0,t ). Using (178) and (179), the differential
equations for the switching functions may be integrated to yield for








ai , -6T. St (
e - (BQ




St . -aT. ax
,







Let x denote the smallest positive root of S (t=t ) = and similarly
u u u
L"or t . Then the backwards switching time t is given by
t. = maximum (t ,t ) ? T
1 U V
(182)
We will now give some results for the following two cases:
(1) o..- 3,
(2) 6 > a.
















* bA. - SB,
(183)
(184)
Omitting the details for now, the following theorem may be proven:
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it is necessary that —(t=0) < bA(t=0) (where
A(t) and B(t) are given by (170) and (171))
(2) it is necessary and sufficient that










A similar theorem concerning T may be proven. The reader should note
that Theorems 3 and 4 are basically identical. Thus, there is great simi-
larity (at least for the results so far obtained) between the cases of
J inearly-decreasing-wi th-t imo returns from ground support and exponentially-
decreasing ones. As above, we see that in order for a switch in extremal
strategies from (179) to occur additional conditions in addition to the war
being of sufficient duration are required. This should be contrasted with
the constant coefficient case (i.e. Case (II)) considered in Section 5.
As an immediate corollary to Theorem 4, we have
COROLLARY 4 .1: For the case in which a = 8, if
~(t=0) > aB(t=0) and ~(t=0) > bA(t=0)
dt dt
then the solution to (144) with A(t) and
B(t) given by (170) and (171) is given by
.
u*(t) = 1
< for < t < T.
W*(t) - 1
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In Case (2) : 3 > a, the following theorem may be shown to hold




it is sufficient that






Shortness of time precludes further resu] ts for this problem. The author
hopes to give further details in the future.
8 • Dis cussion .
In this appendix we have applied the theory of differential games
(including the. theory of state variable inequality constraints developed
in Appendix A) to the study of optimal air-war strategies. We have con-
sidered a generalization of the tactical air-war game studied by Isaacs
[7] and others [1], [4], [6], [16], [24]. We saw that when one considers
salvage values for aircraft, time-dependent returns from ground support,
and time-dependent Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients, previous solution
methodology for the tactical air-war game can result in non-optimal strate-
gies. For example, during the early phases of the air war, it may not be
optimal to annihilate enemy aircraft whenever possible. We also saw that
when there is a residual value for aircraft at the "end" of the war, optimal
strategies may be appreciably different than those for the special case
previously considered.
We developed a (fairly) complete solution to the generalization of
the tactical air-war game for the case of constant coefficients. Some work
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still remains to be done in one special case. We propose this to ONR as a
future research task. We also partially developed extremal strategies in
two cases of time-varying (decreasing) returns from ground support (both
linearly-decreasing returns and also exponentially-decreasing ones). In
these cases we have shown that optimal strategies for both sides may be to
always concentrate on supporting the ground forces regardless of how long
the conflict lasts . For the case in which av < A(t=T) and bv < B(t=T),
X i
we showed that an additional condition had to be satisfied (namely,
-r-(t=0) < bA(t=0)) in order for it to be possible for a switch in X's
at
optimal strategy to occur. (It should be noted that this latter condition
is always satisfied for the case of constant returns from ground support.)
The results of this appendix are not only of intrinsic interest but
are also useful for checking the computational adequacy of Lagrange dynamic
programming, which has been proposed as a compational method for time-sequential
combat games [13], [14]. It should be pointed out that there may be severe
computational difficulties in using Lagrange dynamic programming when the
solution to a time-sequential combat game has multiple extremals (as is
frequently the case (see [19])).
We think that an understanding of the parameters which affect optimal
air-war strategies is essential. In particular, the effects on optimal
strategies of considering salvage values for aircraft, time-dependent returns
for ground support, and time-dependent Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients
are not entirely understood at this time. We feel that an analytic approach
like that employed here is very useful for discovering cause-effect relation-
ships between optimal strategies and modelling assumptions. We have laid
the foundations for future research in this area and recommend such future
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study to ONR. Of particular importance, is to determine whether or not
the hasic model is adequate. A basic shortcoming of the model (1) is that
it does not evaluate air-war tactics within the context of ground-war
objectives. The model suboptimizes . In the next appendix we briefly
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APPENDIX E: Some Problems for Future Study.
1 . Introduction
.
In this appendix we will briefly describe several important problems
for possible future research. These problems arc all extensions of work
reported botli here in this report and elsewhere [9], [10].
As we have pointed out recently [11], when we began our research, the
state-of-the-art of deterministic control theory (at least that for applica-
tions to operations research (see [12])) was not sufficient to allow routine
solution of even the simplest Lanchester-type optimal control problem. Our
research approach has been to consider a sequence of idealized models of
increasing mathematical complexity and also increasing operational, realism.
At this point in time, most of the simplest Lanchester-type tactical
allocation structures have been fairly thoroughly studied. Some theoretical
results in optimal control theory have resulted from this examination [12],
[13]. To solve the problems at hand that we propose, we would build upon
the knowledge gained by solving numerous particular examples.
The problems that we will elaborate upon below may be referred to as
(1) fire support for several ground units,
(2) incorporation of logistics considerations,
(3) effect of the form of the criterion functional in combat
optimization problems.
All the above problems are quite important. The first is important because
it is a closer approximation to the type of decision that a commander must
make in allocating supporting fires to aid various friendly units than we
have previously considered. The second is important because it incorporates
logistics considerations into Lanchester-type equations of warfare. As far
as Navy missions are concerned, this is very important, since sea-based
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supply and re-supp]y is a principle Navy combat support mission. The third
is important because it provides more insight into the relationship between
the structure of optimal strategies and the nature of (system) objectives
(here nonlinear)
.
As we first pointed out in [11], for the purposes of military analysis,
it is convenient to consider that there are three essential parts of any
dynamic combat optimization problem:
(a) the decision criteria (for both combatants),
(b) the model of conflict termination conditions (and/or unit
breakpoints)
,
(c) the model of combat dynamics.
Our proposed problems (1) and (2) above fall into the category of research
on the effects on the structure of optimal strategies of aspect (c), whereas
(3) falls into the category of research on (a). It is this central analysis
aspect of the combatants' decision criteria that the author believes is the
weakest link in the chain of assumptions in current analyses. Pugh and
Mayberry [4] have recently proposed methodology for this important topic
of measures of effectiveness in dynamic combat optimization problems.
However, they do not explore the cons equences of various functional forms
of the criterion functional. This is the objective of studying problem (3).
Finally, it should be pointed out that all the problems considered
below are stated in their simplest form. This is because of our research
objective of studying solution properties, an objective whose attainment is
facilitated by the availability of complete, explicit analytic solutions.
More realistic versions of these problems are readily formulated. However,
mathematical tractability is sacrificed when this is done. Moreover, our
results for such idealized problems provides guidance for developing numeri-
cal solution algorithms for more realistic campaign models.
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2 • Fire Support of Several Ground Units .
Consider combat between heterogeneous X and Y ground forces
(infantry). Contact exists between these forces along the Forward Edge
of the Battle Area (FEBA) . The X ground forces are composed of two units,
denoted as X. and X , and similarly for the Y ground forces. It is
assumed that the. X forces are only in contact (i.e. combat) with the
Y forces and similarly for X . In each of the two "one-on-one" battles
both combatants undergo a "square-law" attrition process (see [6]) from
enemy (small arms) fire.
The problem facing the X commander is to determine the "best" dis-
tribution of the fire of his artillery, denoted as U, over the enemy units,
i.e. Y and Y . The artillery U fires at a constant rate into the
(constant) area of an enemy unit without feedback as to the destructiveness
of this fire. This situation is shown in Figure 1. X's decision criterion
;'c **
is the net worth of survivors (with a linear utility for survivors ). For
the purposes of this report, discussion of the stopping rule (i.e. battle
termination model) is not essential and is omitted.
Mathematically, the problem may be stated as
T T
maximize {v x(T) - w y(T)},
dX
l





Pugh and Mayberry [4] suggest using the ratio of aggregated force value
For our purposes here the exact form of the criterion functional is not
essential.























x.(t=0) = x° and y.(t=0) = y° for i = 1,2,1 1 1 J x
x
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(State Variable Inequality Constraints),
<
<J>
< 1 (Contro] Variable Inequality Constraints),
where
x.(t) [for i = 1,2] is the number of X. infantry at time t,
similarly for y.(t),
a. [for i = 1,2] is the constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate







c. [for i - 1,2] is the constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate





= (vr v2 ),
v. is the value of one surviving X. unit,
l l
similarly for w.
To be precise, in the above formulation we have
-a.y. for x. > 0,
dx. I x J x x







- (j^y, for y
n
> 0,Ud Yl u l"l ^l'l LUL '1
for y - 0.
Moreover, we would begin by considering the case in which x , x , y ,
and y° are such that x
x
(T) ,x (T) ,y (T) ,y (T) > 0.
It should be clear that the above problem (1) is important because
it considers a basic aJ location problem for artillery fire. With minor
modifications the model (1) may be extended to other cases of interest:
(a) let b = b.
;
= for a prescribed duration battle attack scenario
(see Appendix D), (b) for an amphibious assault one adds replacements for
the X. and K» forces.
Instead of being called "artillery," the fire support units U may
be called "Naval guns." Of particular relevance to Navy problems in the
determination of the optimal allocation of Naval gunfire in amphibious
assaults
.
Finally, it seems appropriate to discuss a technical difficulty of
solving the above problem (1). As are all Lanches ter-type fire distribution
problems, the above problem (1) is a singluar problem of optimal control,
since ~~j = (see [7]), where H denotes the Hamiltonian. The problem
becomes particularly difficult when a singular solution exists in x - p
space (see [1]). A preliminary investigation has shown that this is the
case for the problem at hand. It should be pointed out that we have encoun-





A Lanchester-Type Optimal Control Problem with Logistics Considerations.
In this section we will describe a simple model which, nevertheless,
can generate some insights into tactics used by General George S. Patton,
Jr., in World War II. Consider combat between X and Y forces. Part of
the X forces (denoted as X ) can be kept in reserve and consequently do
not consume supplies as rapidly as the combatant forces (denoted as X.. ) do.
It is assumed that the effectiveness of X.. against Y depends upon the
amount of supplies (denoted as S) that they have. For the problem under
consideration, this effectiveness will be represented by a Lanchester attri-
tion-rate coefficient b
1
= b..(S). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that
b
1
(S) is a concave function of S with certain other appropriate properties
Further research should be done on this important topic. For convenience in
our initial investigation, we would assume that b is constant but that
S > 0. We further assume that due to "pipeline" capacity there is an upper
limit to the rate at which supplies can be replenished.
The decision variable under the control of the X commander is the
rate of reinforcing (or withdrawing for u(t) negative) the X forces.
This situation is shown in Figure 4. The objective of the X commander
is to maximize the net worth of survivors (considering linear utilities).
In mathematical terms, the problem may be stated as follows.


















Figure 2. Diagram of Supply-Constrained Combat Problem.
with initiai conditions




x ,x ,y,S > (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
-W < u < R (Control Variable Inequality Constraints),




(b) y(T) = 0,
or (c) S < 0,
where
c denotes the rate of consumption of supplies S by one X




P denotes the "pipeline" capacity,
S denotes the supply level of the X. forces,
u(t) denotes the rate of reinforcement of X, forces by the
X forces (negative quantity denotes withdrawal),
and other notation is similar to that used in the statement of problem (1).
A preliminary examination of problem (2) has yielded an interesting
result: if supplies are to become a constraining factor for the X forces
later in combat, then the optimal tactic is to "overcommit" forces early in
the campaign (i.e. forces are being withdrawn at the moment that the supply
constraint becomes active). Of particular mathematical difficulty is the
presence of a second order SVIC (i.e. S > 0) (see [8]) in this problem.
The only previous work considering logistics aspects apparently is
by Moglewer and C. Payne [3]. Our above problem (2) may be extended to
yield insights for policy planning regarding "pipeline capacity" (logistics
capacity), pipeline protection, pipeline interdiction, etc.
4 . Form of the Criterion Functional in Time-Sequential Combat Optimization
Problems .
In all our past research, we have with one exception (see Appendix D
of this report) always considered a linear utility for survivors in the
criterion functional. It is of interest to examine how the valuation of
survivors affects the structure of optimal strategies. It seems appropriate
to begin such an investigation by considering the simplest problem possible.
Thus, we will consider a version of the "Tactical Air-War Campaign" (see
[10] and Appendix B of this report).
k
See [2] for methodology for the . development of such a linear utility
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subject to: — = r,
(air-battle dynamics)




and y(t=0) = y ,
x,y > (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
<
<f>
< 1 (Control Variable Inequality Constraints),
where
x(t) and y(t) denote the numbers of X and Y aircraft,
respectively, at time t,
b denotes a Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient (the rate
at which one X aircraft shoots down Y aircraft),
r and s denote replacement rates,
Y (t) denotes the fraction (at time t) of total X aircraft
which fly counter-air missions and hence shoot down Y
aircraft,
and Q(x(t
f ) ,y (t f ) ) denotes the (salvage) value of X and Y
aircraft at the end of the planning horizon.
It is of interest to examine the dependence of the structure of the
optimal allocation policy for X aircraft upon the natiare of G(x f ,y f ),
where x
f
denotes x(t=t f ), etc. It seems reasonable on military grounds
to require that
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T~~ > and ^- < o for all x c ,y £ > 0.3x
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(b) Q(x f) y f ) =f"f G(y
f
) *
It is of interest to study cases in which F (and/or G) is a
(A) concave function,
or (B) convex function,
or (C) quasi-concave function,
or (D) quasi-convex function.
To consider a concrete example, if G(y ) were a concave function, it might
look like that shown in Figure 3. One possibility for an analytic representa-




) - -~ (1-e
r
). (4)
After the dependence of the structure of the optimal allocation
policy upon the nature of the terminal return G(x f ,y f ) has been studied
for the above problem (3) (preliminary analysis indicates that this problem
is analytically tractable), it would seem appropriate to consider a problem
like the Isbell-Marlow fire distribution problem (see [5], [6], [8], or [10]),
which is at the next level of analytical complexity. Such a research program











Number of Y survivors, y
Figure 3. Decreasing Marginal Value for Survivors
would lead to a better understanding of the effects upon (optimal) military
decision making of the valuation of (system) objectives. This in turn would
result in a better understanding of the optimization of combat dynamics.
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